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Human Rights Realism
Natalie R. Davidson*
ABSTRACT

In the aftermath of gross human rights abuses, when, if at all,
should we forego legal accountability? Human rights scholars debated

this question in the 1980s and 1990s, in what was referred to as the
"peace versus justice" debate. The "justice"side won the day among
human rights advocates, among whom the dominant position is that

legal accountability is a necessary response to atrocity and cannot be
limited by political considerations(aposition this Article terms "human
rights absolutism'). However, this question has resurfaced in the
twenty-first century, in intense debates with interlocutors outside the
field of human rights. Faced with the development of international

criminal justice, Alien Tort Statute litigation, and regional human
rights court jurisprudence on the right to a remedy, courts, state

officials, and conservative scholars argue that legal accountability
should be limited to avoid hampering states' control of their internal
affairs and international relations (a position this Article terms
"sovereigntism"). Some scholars take a middle ground and argue that

legal responses to gross human rights abuses should be limited only to
avoid harm to peace or democratic decision-making. However, the latter
have not yet offered a persuasivejustification for their position nor a
rationale for distinguishing peace and democratic decision-making
from other values advanced by sovereigntistsas limits to accountability.
This Article offers a new middle ground between sovereigntism and
human rights absolutism, under a position it terms "human rights
realism."Drawingon American legal realism and grounded in human

rights values, this approach mandates limiting legal accountability to
avoid those consequences that threaten certain core human rights, and

the Article identifies armed conflict and economic inequalityas relevant
consequences. This approachovercomes both human rights absolutists'
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of Law Drawing Board session, the Private Law Workshop at Tel Aviv University, the
Departmental Seminar at Tel Aviv University Faculty of Law, and the Hebrew
University Jerusalem International Law Workshop. I also thank Gilad Mor and Noam
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denial of the politics of accountability mechanisms and sovereigntists'
subordination of accountability to values other than human rights.
Moreover, drawing on legal realist writing on the right-remedy
relationship, this Article offers a robust justification for accepting
limitations to legal accountability across a wide range of mechanisms
and a principledframework for consideringsuch limitationsin light of
evolving empirical evidence.
The argument is developed by revisitingthe debate about universal
civil jurisdictionand expanding the analysis to internationalcriminal
law and regional court jurisprudence. The Article shows that human
rights realism offers not only a promising normative framework for
integratingpolitical considerationsinto human rights enforcement but
also that it sheds new light on recent developments, such as African
state threats of withdrawal from the InternationalCriminal Court.
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INTRODUCTION

Since the 1980s, human rights advocates have argued for legal
accountability in cases of gross human rights abuses, seeking the
prosecution of individual perpetrators and the compensation of
victims. 1 As a result, regional human rights bodies now impose on
states a duty to investigate, prosecute, and provide compensation for
serious human rights abuses, ruling that even democratically reached
amnesties violate victims' right to an effective remedy and to a
hearing. 2 The International Criminal Court (ICC) was established to
prosecute grave crimes, and its rules of admissibility are designed to
incentivize states to prosecute those crimes committed within their
territory. 3 Prodded by victim groups, domestic criminal courts have
also exercised universal jurisdiction over heinous crimes. 4 In addition,
civil domestic courts have been asked to entertain tort lawsuits
concerning abuses occurring in foreign countries under universal civil
jurisdiction (UCJ). Since the 1980s, US federal courts have created a

Kathryn Sikkink & Hun Joon Kim, The Justice Cascade: The Origins and
1.
Effectiveness of Prosecutionsof Human Rights Violations, 9 ANN. REV. L. & Soc. SCI. 269,
270-71 (2013). Following Sikkink and Kim, I use the term "human rights" to refer not
only to international human rights law, but also more broadly to international norms
protecting individuals from state an'd mass violence such as norms of international

criminal law.
Ruti Teitel, Transitional Justice and Judicial Activism - A Right to
2.
Accountability?, 48 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 385, 407 (2015). The Inter-American Court's first
ruling finding a violation of state obligations despite an amnesty was Barrios Altos v.
Peru, Merits, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 75 (Mar. 14, 2001). However, in
2013, the Court ruled that "in certain transitional situations between armed conflicts
and peace, it can happen that a State is not in a position to implement fully and
simultaneously, the various international rights and obligations it has assumed."
Massacres of El Mozote and Nearby Places v. El Salvador, Merits, Reparations, and
Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 252, ¶ 38 (Oct. 25, 2012) (separate
opinion by Garcia-Sayan, J.).
See infra notes 119-122 and accompanying text.
3.
NAOMI ROHT-ARRIAZA, THE PINOCHET EFFECT: TRANSNATIONAL JUSTICE IN
4.
THE AGE OF HUMAN RIGHTS 37-42 (2005).
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form of universal jurisdiction in civil cases by entertaining damage
lawsuits under the Alien Tort Statute (ATS) against individuals
alleged to have violated, even outside the United States, norms of
international law enjoying universal acceptance. In other jurisdictions,
victims have brought civil claims against foreign states and state
officials for torture under ordinary tort or obligations law in the
jurisdictions in which they reside. 5
These transnational mechanisms of legal accountability for
egregious human rights abuses appear acutely challenged today. In the
first decade of the twenty-first century, some European states such as
Belgium and Spain amended their universal criminal jurisdiction
legislation so as to restrict the possibility of taking jurisdiction in
foreign cases. 6 In 2013, in Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., a
conservative majority of the U.S. Supreme Court severely narrowed
the possibility of bringing claims under the ATS, requiring a strong
connection between the claims and the United States. 7 In other
jurisdictions, the principal obstacle to exercises of UCJ is the doctrine
of sovereign immunity, which courts interpret to bar lawsuits
concerning governmental acts not only against foreign states (as is the

general rule in the United States) but also current and former foreign
officials. The supreme courts of Canada and England, as well as the
European Court of Human Rights (ECHR), have rejected attempts to
recognize

a torture exception

to sovereign immunity from

civil

proceedings in decisions that cross-reference each other heavily. 8 The
ICC, for its part, is at risk of losing state parties. The Republic of
Burundi withdrew from the treaty establishing the ICC a few weeks
after the Office of the Prosecutor announced it would open an
investigation for crimes against humanity allegedly committed in that
country, and the African Union has published a set of demands for
reform of the ICC presented as conditions for African states to remain
members of the court.
The challenges to these transnational accountability mechanisms
are typically defended on grounds of the protection of state sovereignty.
While a populist version of this challenge simply denies the validity of
international norms, 9 the version found in academic and legal

&

See infra Part I.
5.
6.
See Luc Reydams, The Rise andFall of UniversalJurisdiction,in RoUTLEDGE
HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 337, 337 (William A. Schabas & Nadia
Bernaz eds., 2011).
7.
Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 569 U.S. 108, 124 (2013).
8.
See, e.g., Estate of Kazemi v. Islamic Republic of Iran, [2014] S.C.R. 62 (Can.);
Jones v. Saudi Arabia [2006] UKHL 26; Al-Adsani v. United Kingdom, App. No.
35763/97, 2001-XI Eur. Ct. H.R. 79; Jones v. United Kingdom, App. Nos. 34356/06
40528/06, 2014-I Eur. Ct. H.R. 1; Zhang v Zemin [2010] NSWCA 255 (Austl.); Fang v.
Jiang[2007] NZAR 420 (N.Z.).
9
This position is exemplified by Donald Trump's assertion that torture "works"
and should be used by the U.S. government. Matthew Weaver & Spencer Ackerman,
Trump Claims Torture Works but Experts Warn of Its Potentially Existential' Costs,
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commentary condemns the commission of atrocities but questions the
turn to transnational institutions to directly administer justice or
determine states' remedial obligations. Under the latter position,
which this Article terms "sovereigntism," scholars point to a range of

risks posed by transnational accountability mechanisms for states'
control of their internal affairs and/or international relations. These
include concerns for domestic institutions' discretion to address
violations and allocate resources within their political community; the
smooth conduct of inter-state relations; or, with respect to universal
jurisdiction, the power of the legislative and executive branches of
government to conduct foreign relations in relation to the judiciary.10
The common response from the human rights camp is to affirm
the non-derogable character of accountability for serious abuses. While
in the 1980s and 1990s human rights advocates debated the legality
and benefits of amnesties in transitions away from dictatorship or

conflict, over time they came to deny that legal justice conflicts with
truth and peace, under the motto of "anti-impunity."" Though many
human rights advocates and scholars recognize the privileged role
2
played by domestic legal institutions in responding to abuses,1 the
dominant position among them is that, subject to guarantees of due
process for defendants, international law mandates criminal
proceedings and compensation of victims as necessary responses to
atrocity. A clear illustration of this position-which this Article terms
"human rights absolutism" for its inflexible view of the need for a legal
response-can be found in the following recent statement by Theodor
Meron:
We insist on accountability for violations of international law because that is how
we defend the law and demonstrate our insistence on respect for the law going
forward. If we fail to ensure accountability across the board, we risk undermining

the very beneficial effects to which the nascent accountability drive that has built
over the past quarter-century has given rise. We risk telling states and
individuals that the requirements set forth in international law-whether

PM),
https://www.theguardian.com/us3:01
26,
2017,
(Jan.
GUARDIAN
news/2017/jan/26/donald-trump-torture-absolutely-works-says-us-president-in-firsttelevision-interview [https://perma.cc/XER8-FXPW] (archived Sept. 26, 2020).
See infra notes 84-87, 93, 97, 123 and accompanying text.
10.
Karen Engle, Anti-Impunity and the Turn to Criminal Law in Human Rights,
11.
100 CORNELL L. REV. 1069, 1086-112 (2015) (chronicling the shift in human rights
practice from the acknowledgement of a conflict between criminal justice on the one
hand, and transitional goals such as truth, peace and forgiveness on the other, to a denial
of any such conflict).
Accountability is now envisioned under a "new model in which the primary
12.
institutions for enforcement are domestic criminal courts and the ICC and foreign courts
are the backup institutions or the last resort when the main model of domestic
enforcement fails." Sikkink & Kim, supra note 1, at 272.
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customary or conventional in nature-are not actually binding. That is the last
13
message we would wish to send.

This Article challenges both sovereigntism and human rights
absolutism and offers a novel, intermediate approach to accountability
for human rights abuses. Drawing on legal realism, this approach
acknowledges that legal accountability can have unintended, negative
political consequences. Yet, because it is grounded in human rights
values, it does not accept all political considerations as trumping
accountability. Rather, the Article argues that accountability can be
limited to avoid those political consequences that provide fertile ground
for the commission of gross human rights abuses, and it suggests
armed conflict and rises in economic inequality as examples of such
consequences. Put differently, the Article claims that human rights
protection is strengthened by the recognition of some limitations to
legal accountability for gross human rights abuses.
A number of scholars have argued that legal responses to atrocity
should be limited. Ruti Teitel suggests that international and regional
human rights courts defer more to domestic political arrangements. 14
Sarah Nouwen urges states to recognize an exception to the duty to
prosecute in the proposed Convention on Crimes against Humanity in
order to enable processes such as the South African transition from
Apartheid.1 5 Miles Jackson similarly urges the European Court of
Human Rights to recognize the validity of amnesties furthering
peace.1 6 Scholars have also argued that alternatives to trial should
preclude ICC jurisdiction when they further peace or justice.

17

However, if the critics of full legal accountability point to the harm
posed to values such as peace, they do not address the counterclaim,

13.
Theodor Meron, Closing the Accountability Gap: Concrete Steps Toward
Ending Impunity for Atrocity Crimes, 112 AM. J. INT'L L. 433, 435 (2018).
14.
See Teitel, supra note 2, at 416.
15.
Sarah M.H. Nouwen, Is There Something Missing in the Proposed Convention
on Crimes Against Humanity? A Political Question for States and a Doctrinal One for the
International Law Commission 33 (Univ. Cambridge, Legal Studies Research Paper
Series, Working Paper No. 52/2018, 2018).
16.
Miles M. Jackson, Amnesties in Strasbourg, 38 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 451,
468 (2018).
17.
See, e.g., Darryl Robinson, Serving the Interests of Justice: Amnesties, Truth
Commissions and the International Criminal Court, 14 EUR. J. INT'L. L. 481 (2003); Eric
Blumenson, The Challenge of a Global Standard of Justice: Peace, Pluralism, and
Punishment at the International Criminal Court, 44 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 801 (2005)
(each arguing that while blanket amnesties are never justified, good faith alternative
justice programs should preclude ICC jurisdiction); see also Martha Minow, Do
Alternative Justice Mechanisms Deserve Recognition in International Criminal Law?:
Truth Commissions, Amnesties, and Complementarity at the International Criminal
Court, 60 HARV. INT'L L.J. 1, 42 (2019) (suggesting that domestic restorative justice
processes should preclude ICC jurisdiction when such processes produce individualized
assessments of responsibility, require truthful testimony, and aim to restore communal
trust or the rule of law, or alternatively when such processes are primarily a means to
achieve peace).
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exemplified by Meron's quote above, that the absence of legal
accountability lessens the value of human rights norms. In addition,

because the advocates of a middle ground point to peace and
democratic decision-making as countervailing values that' selfevidently merit protection, they do not offer a rationale for
distinguishing these values from the other considerations advanced by
sovereigntists to limit accountability, such as the smooth conduct of
international relations. Thus, while human rights institutions such as

the

Inter-American

Court

of

Human

Rights

have

at

times

demonstrated flexibility in pushing states to prosecute in the context
of peace-making, 18 the normative ground for such flexibility remains

to be elaborated. This Article seeks to offer a robust justification,
grounded in human rights norms, for accepting limitations to legal
accountability across a wide range of mechanisms. Contrary to calls for
compromise in order to save transnational legal institutions, 19 it
argues for limitations on accountability as the normatively preferable
position.
The argument is developed by revisiting the debate about UCJ in
light of realist writing on the relationship between rights and
remedies. This involves three methodological choices. First, while UCJ

raised issues specific to civil litigation, the heated debate across
jurisdictions concerning it offers a convenient window onto the
assumptions and argumentative strategies of both sovereigntists and

human rights absolutists. This is because the debate on UCJ concerned
the very existence of the accountability mechanism at issue and, hence,
brought up foundational questions about the nature and effects of legal

accountability.

While the Article

demonstrates

the

argument's

applicability to the ICC, universal criminal jurisdiction, and the
jurisprudence of regional human rights courts, focusing on UCJ allows
an in-depth analysis of the arguments put forth on both sides.
Second, the Article conceptualizes UCJ and other transnational
accountability mechanisms as remedies for breaches of international
human rights norms. With respect to UCJ, the ICC, and universal
criminal jurisdiction, this approach follows Dinah Shelton's definition
of "remedies" as encompassing not only the relief given to successful
claimants but also the processes through which claims of violations are
heard. 20 The Article similarly considers the development of a duty to
investigate, prosecute, and compensate in regional human rights
courts as a remedy, in that, like the other three mechanisms, it

See Courtney Hillebrecht, Alexandra Huneeus & Sandra Borda, The
18.
Judicializationof Peace, 59 HARV. INT'L L.J. 279, 299-300 (2018).
For example, Philip Alston's suggestion to recognize head of state immunity
19.
before the ICC as a pragmatic move to preserve membership in the ICC. Philip Alston,
The Populist Challenge to Human Rights, 9 J. HUM. RTS. PRAC. 1, 12-13 (2017).
DINAH SHELTON, REMEDIES IN INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAw 16 (3d ed.
20.
2015).
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constitutes a transnational legal response to gross human rights
abuses that promotes criminal
prosecution and monetary
compensation. 21 Conceptualizing

these institutions

as

remedies

reflects the view advanced by Meron that legal accountability is a mode
of enforcement of international human rights norms that signals these
norms' binding character. Through the prism of the right-remedy
relationship, this Article aims to directly address the human rights
absolutist claim that the lack of legal accountability weakens human
rights norms.

Third, the Article draws on a particular interpretation of
American legal realism. Legal realism is a pragmatic approach to law
that asks how law operates in a social context. It is based on the view
that "any undertaking of law application and development to address
social problems should be grounded in a study of factual context and
potential consequences or the resulting intervention risks being
counterproductive." 22 This requires turning to empirical studies of law.
Yet contrary to the realist approach to international relations, which
views international law primarily through the lens of power, 23 the
reconstruction of legal realism on which this Article relies insists on

the necessity of value judgments in law. 24 Legal realism's complex
approach to law, combining empiricism with normativity, offers a
particularly promising framework for considering questions related to
the political implications of accountability for egregious human rights
abuses. While it does not prescribe any simple formula, legal realism
suggests that some limitations to legal accountability are justified
where such accountability would undermine its underlying purposethe protection of human rights.

Placing various legal mechanisms in the category of remedies does
not imply that individual liability in international criminal law,

individual or corporate liability under UCJ, and state responsibility for
failure to provide adequate remedies are equivalent, though they may
have overlapping justifications and effects, such as accountability,
truth-seeking, and victim empowerment. Neither does this Article
assert that all these legal mechanisms are normatively desirable. Each

The similarities between regional court jurisprudence on a duty to prosecute
21.
and international criminal law have been emphasized by Alexandra Huneeus, who
characterizes regional human rights courts as quasi-international criminal courts.
Alexandra Huneeus, InternationalCriminal Law by Other Means: The Quasi-Criminal
Jurisdictionof the Human Rights Courts, 107 AM. J. INT'L L. 1, 5 (2013).
Gregory Shaffer, The New Legal Realist Approach to InternationalLaw, 28
22.
LEIDEN J. INT'L L. 189, 201 (2015).
See Stephen D. Krasner, Realist Views of InternationalLaw, 96 AM. SOC'Y
23.
INT'L L. PROc. 265, 266 (2002). For a discussion of legal realist influences on
international relations realism, see Gregory Shaffer, Legal Realism and International
Law, in INTERNATIONAL LEGAL THEORY: FOUNDATIONS AND FRONTIERS 1, 8-9 (Jeffrey L.

Dunoff & Mark A. Pollack eds., 2019).
24.
HANoCH DAGAN, REcONSTRUCTING
RETHINKING PRIVATE LAW THEORY 6-7 (2013).

AMERICAN

LEGAL

REALISM

AND
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form of liability should be grounded in a specific set of justifications
derived from the type of defendant (individual, corporation, state) and

type of process (criminal, civil, international), and its desirability,
assessed by taking into account its real-world effects.25 This Article
does not delve into the normative grounds and overall desirability of
each mechanism. Instead, it argues that, even if we assume that all
these legal mechanisms are normatively justified, a similar set of

considerations should lead us to accept some limitations to them.
Part I presents the Article's interpretation of legal realism,
including a realist position that sees limited gaps between rights and

remedies as normatively desirable. Part II describes the cases from the
past decade limiting UCJ. Drawing on the realist approach discussed
in Part I, it critiques both sovereigntist and absolutist human rights
commentary on these cases and on UCJ more broadly. It shows that
the sovereigntist position, relying on a sharp distinction between rights
and remedies, is untenable from a realist perspective as, in practice, it

empties human rights of concrete meaning. While the absolutist
human rights position insists on the provision of remedies for human
rights violations, it is also untenable, as it refuses to account for the

consequences of remedy-seeking.
Having shown the inadequacy of the existing positions on UCJ

and

the

salience

of these

positions

in

debates

about other

accountability mechanisms, Part III takes on the reconstructive strand
of legal realism. It offers human rights realism as a normative
framework that integrates the valuable features of both human rights
absolutism and sovereigntism without their weaknesses. Like human
rights absolutists, it views human rights norms as superior to other
norms, but it acknowledges, like sovereigntists, that the enforcement

of these norms

may

have

undesirable

political

consequences.

Accordingly, Part III argues that legal accountability should be limited,
but only where it risks counterproductively enabling the commission of
certain gross human rights abuses. Part IV illustrates how this
approach would operate in relation to various accountability
mechanisms. With respect to each, it offers a two-tieied approach to
limiting legal accountability based on the degree of empirical certainty
concerning the risk of materialization of a threat to human rights. Part
IV shows that human rights realism offers not only a promising
framework for integrating political considerations into human rights
enforcement in light of evolving empirical evidence but also that it
sheds new light on recent debates, such as African state threats of
withdrawal from the ICC.

25.
For critiques of the turn to criminal law to address mass violence, see ANTIIMPUNITY AND THE HUMAN RIGHTS AGENDA 42-43 (Karen Engle, Zinaida Miller & D.M.

Davis eds., 2016).
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II. LEGAL REALISM, RIGHTS AND REMEDIES

By "legal realism," this Article refers to the legal movement that
developed in the United States under that name, starting with Oliver
Wendell Holmes's 1897 address and then more forcefully from the
1930s. 26 This Article follows the particular reading of legal realism

offered by Hanoch Dagan, who emphasizes the implications of legal
realism for private law theory. 27 Deploying this approach with respect
to international norms prohibiting gross human rights abuses, in

particular while holding the view that human rights norms are
hierarchically superior to other norms, requires various adjustments
detailed in this Part and in Part III.
A. Legal Realism from Domestic to InternationalLaw
Legal realism is grounded in pragmatism. 28 This pragmatism is
expressed in realists' view of law as a social practice rather than a set
of concepts and their call to study both the law as applied by courts and
the forces shaping courts' decisions. 29 This pragmatism also imbues
the normative part of the realist project, which is most relevant to this
Article. Insisting that law is a vehicle for policy, realists urge lawyers
to reconsider the law in light of desired policy choices. This normative
task has two components. The first is a deconstructive or explanatory
stage, exposing the political, social, distributional, and other concrete
consequences of legal rules. The second is a reconstructive stage
whereby a policy preference is chosen, and the law is redesigned
accordingly. Neither stage is straightforward, and, taken together,
they can be contradictory. In fact, Dagan and other scholars of legal
realism describe this approach as a set of productive tensions. 0 This
Part explains what each stage requires, suggesting that, despite the
complexities of its application, legal realism offers a promising way to
consider the political implications of legal accountability for gross
human rights abuses.

26.
See generally Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 110 HARv. L. REV.
991 (1997). This article does not draw on other legal realist writing, whether from
Scandinavia or elsewhere.
27.
DAGAN, supra note 24, at 104-05.
28.
On the relationship between legal realism and philosophical pragmatism, see
Shaffer, supra note 22, at 193.
29.
Holmes, supra note 26, at 997.
30.
On the productive tension between empiricism, which requires a belief in the
possibility of objectively assessing the world, and pragmatism, which views absolute
truths with skepticism, see Andrew Lang, New Legal Realism, Empiricism, and
Scientism: The Relative Objectivity of Law and Social Science, 28 LEIDEN J. INT'L L. 231,
254 (2015). More generally, Hanoch Dagan portrays legal realism as a set of constitutive
tensions between power and reason, science and craft, and tradition and progress. See
DAGAN, supra note 24.
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The explanatory stage of normative realist analysis involves both
piercing the veil of legal discourse to expose the allocations of power
and resources effected by legal rules and conducting empirical studies
on the effect of legal interventions. The starting point of legal realism
is the critique of formalism. 31 Legal realism famously challenged the
formalist view of law as an autonomous sphere by exposing the
distributional effects of even private law, that area of law appearing

most detached from public considerations. 32 For realists, formalism is
not only inaccurate as a descriptive matter because of inevitable
doctrinal indeterminacy, but it is also harmful as it obscures the value
judgments made by judges and thus shields normative choices from
scrutiny. 33 The formalist obscuring of politics is effected, argued Felix

Cohen, through the use of legal fictions, the "language of
transcendental nonsense" that has no connection to reality. 34 The
absence of economic, social, and ethical substance in the legal fictions
invoked as justifications for normative solutions has the effect of

concealing the social forces which mold the law, as well as the
consequences of law. Part II will demonstrate that both sovereigntists
and human rights absolutists rely heavily on such abstract legal
fictions to obscure the undesirable concrete consequences of their
respective positions.

To overcome this practice, Cohen urged lawyers to develop
analytical categories reflecting concrete phenomena. Additionally,
realists advocated shifting attention to the concrete social life of the
law, by conducting empirical studies of law's implications. The early
realists' enthusiasm and faith in social science 35 is difficult to sustain
after the mid-1980s, when critical and feminist approaches to social
science questioned scholars' ability to objectively access knowledge
about the world.36 Even assuming a positivist approach to sociology, it
can take decades to accumulate a sufficient body of knowledge to build
scholarly consensus about the concrete consequences of a given legal
arrangement. 37 Yet, from a realist perspective, there is no choice but

to at least try to ascertain empirically the consequences of legal

-

31.

DAGAN, supra note 24, at 16-17.

32.
33.

Id. at 18-24, 33.
Id. at 22.

34.

Felix S. Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense and the FunctionalApproach, 35

COLUM. L. REV. 809, 912 (1935).
This faith is exemplified by Holmes's famous statement that "the man of the
35.
future is the man of statistics and the master of economics." Holmes, supra note 26, at
1001.
36.
THE LANDSCAPE OF QUALITATIVE RESEARCH: THEORIES AND ISSUES 25-26
(Norman K. Denzin & Yvonna S. Lincoln eds., 2d ed. 2003).
37.

Only after four decades of research have criminologists in the United States

reached the consensus that the likelihood of punishment deters crime more effectively
than the severity of punishment. Hyeran Jo & Beth A. Simmons, Can the International

Criminal Court Deter Atrocity?, 70 INT'L ORG. 443, 446-47 (2016).
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choices. For lawyers to give up on empiricism is to limit their vision of
the law to the realm of ideas and to forego responsibility for the
concrete implications of their normative choices.
The reconstructive stage of realist analysis involves deciding on a
policy course and designing the law accordingly. In other words, legal
realists insist not only on explaining but on making value judgments. 38
Recognizing that law inescapably involves making value judgments

does not, however, require endorsing a fixed set of ideals. To the
contrary, realists view claims of absolute truths with skepticism. 39 The

process of formulating a normative position is therefore complicated
not only by the fact that in many cases the empirical evidence on which
such position is to be based is inconclusive but also by value skepticism.
Yet to avoid nihilism or the abandonment of the law to groups
promoting undesirable political, distributional, or ethical choices, legal
realists must try to formulate the best normative stance they can.
Their solution to these tensions is to conceive of normativity as an
ongoing methodology: the constant critique and search for
improvement of the law. 40
For American legal realists, an important aspect of this
methodology is contextualism. Dagan has persuasively dismissed the
view that realist contextualism can be equated with particularist
adjudication on a case-by-case basis, as this would carry the risk of
endorsing and perpetuating unjust social norms. 41 Contextualism, for
most realists, refers instead to the preference for narrow legal
categories, enabling legal analysis to be tailored to the specific features
of legal interactions. 4 2 Transposing this approach, heavily reliant on
value judgments, to the international realm can therefore not justify
cultural relativism in the area of human rights such that crimes
against humanity, for instance, would be interpreted differently across
cultures. Neither can it justify giving states full discretion as to the
remedies available for gross human rights violations. Yet, in the
international context, a legal realist methodology should include
contextualism in the procedural sense of allowing some domestic
tailoring of remedies for the breach of universal norms where such
tailoring would promote human rights better than internationally
mandated remedies. Such an understanding of contextualism flows
from the geographic and cultural distance between international

38.
DAGAN, supra note 24.
39.
See Felix S. Cohen, Field Theory and Judicial Logic, in THE LEGAL
CONScIENcE: SELECTED PAPERS OF FELIX S. COHEN 121, 125-26 (Lucy Kramer Cohen
ed., 1960); see also DAGAN, supranote 24, at 7 (citing id.).
40.
Hessel E. Yntema, Jurisprudenceon Parade, 39 MICH. L. REv. 1154, 1169
(1941).
41.
DAGAN, supra note 24, at 57.
42.
Id. at 54-56. The focus on narrow legal categories is admittedly at odds with
this article's approach, which offers a single analytical framework for determining
limitations to widely divergent accountability mechanisms.
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institutions and the sites of gross human rights violations, which make
assessments of the concrete social consequences of transnational

remedies-by the drafters of treaties establishing remedies or the
judges awarding them-exceedingly difficult. Domestic institutions'

proximity to the societies where the abuses occurred supports taking
into consideration those institutions' good faith assessments of the
contextual application of remedies.
Many of these realist insights, not least among them the critique
of legal formalism and the desire to avoid counterproductive results,
are now accepted by numerous schools of legal thought. Legal realism
has also left its mark on various approaches to international law, most
notably the New Haven School, which takes as its starting point the
realist understanding of adjudication as policy-making and adopts an
to
approaches
and critical
methodology, 4
interdisciplinary
international law, which expose international law's implications for
power relations. However, as pointed out by Dagan in the context of

domestic law, each school of thought has emphasized some aspects of
realism over others. 4 4 For instance, while the New Haven School
emphasizes decision-making processes, it lacks realism's emphasis on
the concrete consequences of particular legal interventions. Critical
approaches, for their part, are vaguer than legal realists about how to
design the law to further policy. Because the realist blend of
empiricism with normativity is not sufficiently captured by the heirs of
realism, this Article, following Dagan, returns to the "origins." In doing

so, the present approach is close to the New Legal Realist school of
international law identified by Gregory Shaffer, a school that examines
45
international law empirically in order to solve normative quandaries.
However, in the area of international human rights, it is mostly the

empirical aspect of realism that has been taken up by New Legal
Realists.4 6 This Article therefore turns to realist writing about private
law-from the 1930s and more recently-which provides a realist
framework for considering the relationship between right and

remedies from a normative perspective.
B. Legal Realism and the Right-Remedy Relationship
As part of early legal realists' pragmatism, they insisted on the
importance of remedies and enforcement to understanding the extent
to which rights are recognized in the law. 4 7 Accordingly, Karl Llewelyn

ANDREA BIANCHI, INTERNATIONAL
43.
DIFFERENT WAYS OF THINKING 99-109 (2016).
DAGAN, supra note 24, at 3-4.
44.
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Shaffer, supra note 22.
45.
See Gregory Shaffer & Tom Ginsburg, The Empirical Turn in International
46.
Legal Scholarship, 106 AM. J. INT'L L. 1, 19-25 (2012).
47.

DAGAN, supra note 24, at 148.
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insisted on viewing rights and remedies symbiotically and avoiding
both a pure remedies discourse and a pure rights discourse. As
recounted by Dagan, Llewelyn discussed the historical transition in the
common law from a discourse focused on remedies to one focused on
rights. "Under the former, the pertinent question was: 'On what facts
could one man make use of any specific one of the specific ways of
making the court bother another man?"' 4 8 This approach was criticized
for not giving sufficient weight to the underlying purposes of remedies,
that is, rights. Legal thinkers thus shifted attention from often archaic
procedural law to rights and the purposes they furthered. Remedies
were "relegated to the periphery of attention" and viewed as "'adjective
law' merely-devices more or less imperfect for giving effect to the
important things, the substantive rights which make up the substance

of the law."4 9 While this shift accorded with realism in that legal
categories were no longer to be accepted simply because they existed,
but, in view of the purposes they served (thus opening the law to
criticism and reform), Llewelyn pointed to the price of the move to a
discourse of rights: "to clothe one's statement about what rules of law
are in terms of rights, is to double the tendency to disregard the
limitations actually put on rules or rights by practice and by
remedies." 50 This tendency is especially heightened due to the use of
the word "rights" which implies a "notion of 'rightness' (in the sense of
what ought to be)." 51
For Llewelyn, one cannot understand the content and meaning of
a right without examining the remedies available to protect that right.
As a result, he rejected the existence of gaps between rights and
remedies, similarly to human rights absolutists. Contemporary realist
writers, however, reject what Stephen Smith calls the "rubber-stamp
view" of the relationship between rights and remedies on the grounds
that it fails to account for the significance of the institution enforcing
rights.5 2 Under this view, the realist call to pay profound attention to
law's impact requires us to explore the wider social and political
implications of proposed institutional interventions, including the
implications of full remedial enforcement itself. And because some of
those interventions produce effects negative for human welfare, in
these authors' view, limited gaps between rights and remedies are
justified.
the right-remedy relationship by
Smith conceptualizes
distinguishing among three types of "right": private right-"the rights

48.
49.
REV. 431,
50.

Id.
Karl N. Llewellyn, A Realistic Jurisprudence-TheNext Step, 30 COLUM. L.
437 (1930).
Id. at 440.
Id.
51.
Stephen A. Smith, Rights and Remedies, a Complex Relationship, in TAKING
52.
REMEDIES SERIOUSLY 31, 43 (Kent Roach & Robert J. Sharpe eds., 2010); DAGAN, supra
note 24 (building on Smith's discussion).
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that citizens hold against other citizens prior to any judgment by a
court," action right-the right to a court order as a consequence of the
defendant's violation of private right, and court-ordered right-the
53
right that is created when a court makes an order. While private
rights concern the relations among citizens, and thus form part of
private law, action and court-ordered rights (the categories
corresponding to remedies as defined in this Article) "are rights against
courts, and the rules that govern action rights are rules that tell courts
how they should behave. The law of court orders is fundamentally a
54
branch of public law."
Because court orders implicate state action, considerations other
than the plaintiffs' rights come into play and, in Smith's view, justify
limiting the availability of remedies. Smith envisions three such
considerations. First, courts are public institutions funded by taxpayer
money, and, hence, cost considerations become relevant. 55 Second,
court orders are an invocation of the state's coercive powers.5 6 Third,
while private law rules of conduct among citizens are abstract
commands, "[c]ourt orders are personalized directives, issued by a
57
court, that command a specific individual to do a specific thing." The
last two considerations mean that action and court-ordered rights
involve state violence in a way that respecting the underlying right

does not. These considerations lead Smith to accept various types of
gaps between rights and remedies, among them substitute remedies,

such as damages instead of specific performance, and the preclusion of
remedies, for instance, through statutes of limitation.
The prohibition of torture and other gross human rights abuses
are norms regulating the exercise of public power by the state or statelike entities. 5 8 With respect to these norms it is therefore difficult to
apply Smith's neat distinction between private and public
relationships. However, this Article draws from Smith's analysis an
underlying rationale, which is the realist understanding that the

53.
54.

55.
56.
57.
58.

Smith, supra note 52, at 40-42.
Id. at 44.
Id. at 44-45.
Id. at 45.

Id.
David Luban, A Theory of Crimes Against Humanity, 29 YALE J. INT'L L. 85,

91 (2004); see also Jeremy Waldron, Torture and Positive Law: Jurisprudencefor the

White House, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 1681, 1739 (2005); J.M. Bernstein, Torture, POLITIcAL
CONCEPTS: A CRITICAL LEXICON, http://www.politicalconcepts.org/2011/torture#fn-80-9

(last visited Sept. 22, 2020) [https://perma.cc/MEC7-FVWN] (archived Sept. 22, 2020).
While the definition of torture has recently been expanded in international human rights
law to include domestic violence, it is the state's failure to exercise due diligence that is
sanctioned by international law, not the private act of violence on its own. See Lisa Davis,
The Gendered Dimensions of Torture: Rape and Other Forms of Gender-Based Violence
as Torture Under InternationalLaw, in TORTURE AND ITS DEFINITION IN INTERNATIONAL
LAW: AN INTERDISCIPLINARY APPROACH 11 (Metin Basoglu ed., 2017).
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delivery of justice by courts entails social costs (in the case of private
law litigation-use of public funds and exercise of the state's coercive
powers) additional to the costs of respecting the underlying right. In
other words, once the right has been infringed, providing a legal
remedy for it does not simply return the victim to the status quo ante
or perform justice between the individual parties, but produces various
effects in the world that would not have been produced if the defendant
had respected the victim's right. These effects represent limitations on
human freedom and welfare and should therefore not be accepted
unquestioningly. Thus, to adopt a realist approach to law mindful of
the concrete social consequences of legal interventions requires not
only to strive in principle for the granting of remedies, but also to limit
the grant of remedies in order to avoid harmful consequences, that is,
to account in legal design for the concrete consequences of remedyseeking itself.
Drawing on these insights, Part III will offer a legal realist
critique of the UCJ debate. Part IV will thereafter present and justify
an alternative position: human rights realism, which Part V will

illustrate.

III. A REALIST CRITIQUE OF SOVEREIGNTISM AND HUMAN RIGHTS
ABSOLUTISM IN DEBATES ABOUT UNIVERSAL CIVIL JURISDICTION AND
BEYOND

This Part analyses legal arguments in the debate about UCJ to
expose the lack of persuasiveness of each of the sovereigntist and
human rights absolutist positions. In order to make the debate on UCJ
intelligible, subpart A briefly describes the cases limiting UCJ in the
United States, where UCJ has been most developed, as well as in other
jurisdictions and international courts. Subpart B then offers a realist.

critique of the debate. Subpart C demonstrates the prevalence of the
sovereigntist and human rights absolutist arguments beyond UCJ.

A. Introducing the Universal Civil JurisdictionDebate
1. In the United States
The Alien Tort Statute (ATS) grants US federal courts
"jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in
violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States." 5 9 Since
Fildrtigav. Pena-Irala,60 US federal courts had interpreted the ATS as
granting them jurisdiction over damage claims by foreign victims of
gross violations of international law, even in the absence of any clear

59.
60.

28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2018).
Filirtiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 885-87 (2d Cir. 1980).
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61
link between the parties or facts of the case to the United States.

Some authors saw in this interpretation of the ATS the American

"translation" of UCJ, explained by features of the American legal
62
system and culture that lead to a preference for civil litigation. While
initially used against former heads of state and state officials of former

US allies with little political clout in the United States, the targets of
litigation

under

the

statute

expanded

in

the

mid-1990s

to

63
multinational corporations and state officials of powerful nations.
These expansions led to a sustained campaign by conservatives and

business interests in the United States to limit litigation under the
statute. In Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, in 2004, the Supreme Court
rejected the argument that further congressional authorization was
required for courts to recognize rights of action under the ATS. The
Court nevertheless restricted the applicability of the statute to those
international law norms enjoying definite content and a high level of
acceptance. 64 One author explains the Sosa court's preservation of the
possibility of bringing international law violations under the ATS as a
reaction to the Bush administration's strong assertions of power in the
aftermath of September 11, 2001.65
By the time of the 2013 holding in Kiobel, however, the political
context had changed. In that case, Chief Justice Roberts, writing for

the Court, held that the ATS does not apply to conduct occurring on
the territory of another sovereign, based on the presumption against
66
He opined
extraterritoriality, a canon of statutory interpretation.
that "even where the claims touch and concern the territory of the

United States, they must do so with sufficient force to displace the
presumption against territorial application." The statute was passed
in 1789 because the US government was embarrassed by its inability
to provide judicial relief to foreign officials injured in the United States,
that is, in order to avoid diplomatic strife. Yet, in the court's view,
diplomatic strife is precisely what would be caused by extraterritorial
jurisdiction under the statute, referring to objections to the
extraterritorial application of the ATS by various states filed in Kiobel
67
and previous cases.

See Beth Stephens, Translating Filartiga: A Comparativeand International
61.
Law Analysis of Domestic Remedies for InternationalHuman Rights Violations, 27 YALE
J. INT'L L. 1, 6-9 (2002) [hereinafter Stephens, Translating].
62.

See, e.g., GEORGE P. FLETCHER, TORT LIABILITY FOR HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES

9 (2008); see also Stephens, Translating, supra note 61, at 35.
See Beth Stephens, The Curious History of the Alien Tort Statute, 89 NOTRE
63.
DAME L. REV. 1467, 1469 (2014) [hereinafter Stephens, Curious History].
Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 723-24 (2004).
64.
Stephens, Curious History, supra note 63, at 1506.
65.
Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 569 U.S. 108, 115, 124-25 (2013) (citing
66.
Microsoft Corp. v. AT&T Corp. 550 U.S. 437, 454 (2007)).
Id. at 124.
67.
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Having thus restricted the possibilities of using ATS litigation as
a form of UCJ, the U.S. Supreme Court further hampered the
availability of this mechanism by ruling in April 2018, in Jesner v. Arab
Bank, that the ATS could not be invoked against foreign corporations

under the view that the legislature, not the judiciary, should create
new causes of action given its "responsibility and institutional capacity

to weigh foreign-policy concerns." 68 The case concerned a lawsuit by
victims of terrorism in the Middle East against Arab Bank, a Jordanian
institution with a branch in New York, alleged to have helped finance

attacks by terrorist groups. Justice Kennedy, delivering the Court's
opinion, emphasized the threat posed by the lawsuit to Jordan's
economy and, hence, to its cooperation with the United States. 69
2. Outside the United States
The conflict between sovereignty and human rights also took
center stage in UCJ-related cases outside the United States,
principally in common-law jurisdictions. While these jurisdictions lack
legislation comparable to the ATS, they share with the United States
the view that jurisdiction is primarily a procedural matter. This means
that, excepting matrimonial cases, the law does not usually require a
connection between the parties to the dispute and the forum. 70 In those
jurisdictions, as in civil law jurisdictions, such as the Netherlands,

which allows the taking of jurisdiction where the claimant has no
alternative forum (forum necessitatis), it is the doctrine of sovereign
immunity that has constituted a major obstacle to the exercise of
UCJ. 71 In Al-Adsani, the English House of Lords dismissed, on
grounds of sovereign immunity, a lawsuit filed in 1992 by a BritishKuwaiti national against Kuwait for torture, 72 a decision which the
ECHR held, in 2002, did not constitute a disproportionate restriction
on the right of access to court, since it reflected the generally
recognized rule of international law on state immunity. 73 The court sat
in Grand Chamber and divided nine to eight, with the minority arguing
that jus cogens (peremptory) prohibitions supersede national
immunity laws. A Chamber of the ECHR reiterated the Al-Adsani
majority position in 2014 in Jones v. United Kingdom. Four British
nationals had sued the Saudi Ministry of the Interior and other Saudi

68.
69.

Jesner v. Arab Bank, PLC, 138 S. Ct. 1386, 1403 (2018).
See id. at 1406-07.

70.
JAMES FAWCETT & JANEEN M. CARRUTHERS, CHESHIRE, NORTH & FAwcETT:
PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW 354 (14th ed. 2008).

Human Rights Comm., Int'l Law Ass'n (British Branch), Report on Civil
71.
Actions in the English Courtsfor Serious Human Rights Violations Abroad, 2 EUR. HUM.
RTs. L. REV. 129, 145-49, 166 (2001).
Al-Adsani v. Kuwait, 107 I.L.R. 536, 537 (U.K. Ct. App. 1996). The claimant
72.
had not sued individual defendants alongside the state.
Al-Adsani v. United Kingdom, 2001-XI Eur. Ct. H.R. 79, 100.
73.
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officials for torture while the claimants were imprisoned in Saudi
Arabia. The House of Lords held that Saudi Arabia and its officials
were entitled to state immunity under the State Immunity Act as

torture is an act jure imperii (public act) and there is no applicable
exception under the Act. 74 The ECHR upheld this ruling, extending its
75
Al-Adsani approach to state officials. The court did so after having
determined that since Al-Adsani there had been no "evolution in the

accepted international standards as regards the existence of a torture
76
As pointed out by
exception to the doctrine of State immunity."
Chimene Keitner, "[t]he Court treated the International Court of
Justice's 2012 decision in Germany v. Italy as 'authoritative' for the
proposition that at that time 'no jus cogens exception to State immunity
had yet crystallised' under customary international law (para. 198)."77
In January 2020, when dismissing a civil claim brought by a
Palestinian individual against the former Israeli Chief of General Staff
and Air Force Chief in connection with the bombardment of a civilian
residence in Gaza, a Dutch court relied extensively on the above
rulings of the ECHR and ICJ to hold that there is no exception in
customary international law to the functional immunity of incumbent
and former state officials from civil proceedings in foreign domestic
78
courts when the claim alleges the commission of war crimes.
Citing with approval both the House of Lords and the ECHR in
Jones,79 the Supreme Court of Canada held in 2014, in Kazemi Estate
v. Iran, that customary international law does not mandate UCJ such
that states would be compelled to recognize a torture exception to the
immunity of foreign states and foreign state officials from civil

proceedings. 80 The court reflected the view expressed by the majority
in Kiobel that the legislature, not the courts, is the proper venue for
81
deciding whether to allow UCJ

The ECHR in Grand Chamber has also recently rejected the view
that international law requires states to exercise UCJ when reviewing
member states' interpretation of jurisdictional norms. In NaUt-Liman

Jones v. Ministry of Interior of Saudi Arabia [2006] UKHL 26 [13], [2007] 1
74.
AC (HL) 270 (appeal taken from Eng.) (U.K.).
75.
Jones v. United Kingdom, 2014-I Eur. Ct. H.R. 1, 61, 68.
Id. at 60; see also Chimene I. Keitner, Jones v. United Kingdom, 108 AM. J.
76.
INT'L L. 302, 304 (2014).
Keitner, supra note 76, at 304.
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The Hague District Court Judgment of Jan. 29, 2020, Case No.
78.
https://uitspraken.rechtspraak.nl/inziendocument?
ZA
18/647,
C/09/554385/HA
id=ECLI%3ANL%3ARBDHA%3A2020%3A667&fbclid=IwAROZdjP1HBnRUNGEeK1y
(last visited Dec. 7, 2020)
wjTVlcv_pqOGgTmAi8fDs5xbF-q5tFWxUwKHW3I
[https://perma.cc/5PYD-6FDN] (archived Dec. 7, 2020) (English translation).
79.
Kazemi Estate v. Islamic Republic of Iran (2014), 3 S.C.R. 176, paras. 86-87,
90 (Can.).
Id. paras. 61, 153.
80.
Id. paras. 168-70.
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Switzerland, the

ECHR

ruled that

the

Swiss

judiciary's

interpretation of its rules of jurisdiction, which foreclosed a lawsuit by
a Tunisian resident of Switzerland against the former Tunisian

Minister of the Interior for torture in Tunisia, did not violate the
claimant's right of access to court, as it pursued a legitimate aim and
was reasonably proportionate to the aim pursued. The aim was

legitimate, as it was to ensure the proper administration of justice, an
aim not attainable in the court's view with exercises of UCJ, which
create practical difficulties for courts concerning the administration of
evidence and enforcement of judicial decisions, in addition to "potential
diplomatic difficulties." 8 2 As to proportionality, it was present given
that Switzerland was not bound to accept UCJ under norms of
international law, despite the undisputed peremptory nature of the
prohibition of torture.
B. Deconstructingthe Universal Civil JurisdictionDebate
Subpart A establishes that different actors argued in favor of or
against UCJ (or aspects of UCJ) in widely diverging legal contexts.
This subpart reconstructs the arguments put forth on each side of the
UCJ debate, emphasizing the commonalities among sovereigntists, on
the one hand, and human rights advocates, on the other, across
jurisdictions. This subpart argues that, from a realist perspective,
these two reconstructed positions are unpersuasive.
Neither position in the UCJ debate is reducible to formalism nor
to any other coherent jurisprudential approach. The various actors on
each side advanced an assortment of functional and pragmatic
arguments in favor of their positions. Yet both suffer from the formalist
reliance on legal fictions disconnected from reality 83 to defend their
respective normative stances. Specifically, each side refused to
acknowledge the concrete implications of its own legal position, finding
refuge in legal abstraction from the pragmatic concerns raised by the
other side. Sovereigntist judges and commentators insisted on the
validity of the decisions barring UCJ by relying on a sharp distinction
between substance and procedure, accepting that in practice a right
deemed important (freedom for torture) remains, in many cases,
without remedy. The human rights advocates, for their part, denied
the concrete implications of remedy-seeking by appealing to the
distinction between law and politics and to a hollow conception of
remedies as "adjective"-mechanically accruing from rights.

82.
Nait-Liman v. Switzerland, App. No. 51357/07, 11 123-27 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Mar.
15, 2018), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-181789 [https://perma.cc/RF6R-QWVT]
(archived Oct. 13, 2020).
83.
Cohen, supra note 34, at 820.
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1. The Sovereigntist Position:
Distinct

Substance and Procedure

51
as

Courts restricting the possibility of UCJ advanced various

functional justifications for their decisions. Among such consequences,
courts raised concerns about (1) risks to the separation of powers
within the forum if courts become involved in what amounts to foreign
policy, 84 (2) the financial burdens that would be imposed on the forum
85
from entertaining such lawsuits, (3) risks to the sovereignty of the
86
and (4) in turn endangering
state in which the abuses occurred,
relations between the forum and the state in which the abuses
occurred.87
Nevertheless, for those courts and sovereigntist commentators
who frame the discussion as part of international law (namely, courts
and approving commentators outside the United States), the
peremptory status of the international prohibition of torture has to be
addressed. As the next subpart details, the human rights advocates'
argument has been that given the jus cogens (peremptory) status of the
prohibition of torture and the non-jus cogens status of the customary
international law rules on sovereign immunity, the rules of immunity
should give way to rules allowing remedies for breach of the prohibition
of torture.

The courts, in response, recognize the peremptory character of
prohibition of torture. However, they insist on a sharp distinction
between norms and procedure that denies that there is any substantive
conflict between the prohibition of torture and the existence of
immunity. Lord Hoffman, in Jones v. Saudi Arabia, stated: "[T]he

Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 569 U.S. 108, 109 (2013); see Kazemi
84.
Estate, 3 S.C.R. 176, para. 107.
See infra note 164 and accompanying text.
85.
See Al-Adsani v. United Kingdom, 2001-XI Eur. Ct. H.R. 79, 108 (Pellonpaa
86.
& Bratza, JJ., concurring) (arguing that if the Court held that immunity from suit was
incompatible with the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental

Freedoms, "the Court would have been forced to hold that the prohibition of torture must
also prevail over immunity of a foreign State's public property .... " ); Philippines v.
Pimentel, 553 U.S. 851, 865 (2008). In Kazemi Estate, Justice LeBel referred
approvingly to Lord Bingham's opinion for the House of Lords in Jones that civil
proceedings against individual state officials indirectly implead the state. Kazemi Estate,
3 S.C.R 176, para. 90 (citing Jones v. Ministry of Interior of Saudi Arabia, [2006] UKHL
26 [31], [2007] 1 AC (HL) 270 (appeal taken from Eng.)).
Judge Pellonpaa suggested that the litigation's impact on foreign state
87.
property could in turn affect the forum state's ability to effectively conduct international
relations by entering into inter-governmental settlement arrangements or using foreign

assets as leverage in international negotiations. Al-Adsani v. Kuwait, 107 I.L.R. 536, ¶
27 (U.K. Ct. App. 1996); see Jesner v. Arab Bank, PLC, 138 S. Ct. 1386, 1399 (2018)
(referring to the "significant diplomatic tension" between Jordan and the United States
caused by the litigation). In Nait-Liman, the ECHR Grand Chamber similarly referred
to diplomatic difficulties posed by UCJ as legitimate concern of states justifying refusal
to exercise it. Nait-Liman, App. No. 51357/07, ¶ 127.
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United Kingdom, in according state immunity to the Kingdom, is not
proposing to torture anyone. Nor is the Kingdom, in claiming
immunity, justifying the use of torture. It is objecting in limine to the
jurisdiction of the English court to decide whether it used torture or
not." 88 Similarly, the court in Kazemi insisted that "the issue in the
present case is not whether torture is abhorrent or illegal. That is
incontestably true. The question before the Court is whether one can

sue a foreign state in Canadian courts for torture committed abroad." 89
Having made that distinction, they point to the absence of conflict or
incoherence in their position, due to the different conceptual categories
(substantive/procedural)

in which the prohibition of torture and

remedies therefor are located. Such an approach was most eloquently
articulated by Hazel Fox QC in her book The Law of State Immunity
cited approvingly by Lord Bingham in Jones v. Saudi Arabia:90
State immunity is a procedural rule going to the jurisdiction of a
national court. It does not go to substantive law; it does not contradict
a prohibition contained in a jus cogens norm but merely diverts any

breach of it to a different method of settlement. Arguably, then, there
is no substantive content in the procedural plea of State immunity
upon which a jus cogens mandate can bite. 9 1
Similarly, in Germany v. Italy, the International Court of Justice
asserted that there can be no conflict between jus cogens prohibitions
of atrocity and sovereign immunity because rules of immunity are
procedural in character and "do not bear upon the question whether or
not the conduct in respect of which the proceedings are brought was
lawful or unlawful ... notwithstanding that the effect was that a
means by which a jus cogens rule might be enforced was rendered
unavailable." 9 2
In the United States, after the Supreme Court settled in Sosa that
courts could entertain damage suits for international law violations
under the ATS without further congressional authorization, opponents

of a broad interpretation of the ATS shifted from formalist to primarily
functional arguments related to the separation of powers between the
judiciary and the political branches. 93 They have framed their analysis

88.
Jones v. Ministry of Interior of Saudi Arabia, [2006] UKHL 26 [44], [2007] 1
AC (HL) 270 (appeal taken from Eng.).
89.
Kazemi Estate, 3 S.C.R 176, para. 53.
90.
[2006] UKHL 26 [24].
91.
Id. (quoting HAZEL Fox, THE LAW OF STATE IMMUNITY 525 (2004)).
92.
Jurisdictional Immunities of the State (Ger. v. It.), Judgment, 2012 I.C.J. 99,
$$ 93-95 (Feb. 3). The Dutch court dismissing the case against the former Israeli Chief
of General Staff and Air Force Chief cited the ICJ in Germany v. Italy to similarly insist
on the distinction between substance and procedure. See The Hague District Court
Judgment of January 29, 2020, Case No. C/09/554385/HA ZA 18/647 $ 4.12.
For a review of the formalist critiques initially voiced against Fildrtiga,see
93.
Julian Ku & John Yoo, Beyond Formalismin ForeignAffairs: A FunctionalApproach to

the Alien Tort Statute, 2004 SUP. CT. REV. 153, 159-160.

20211

HUMAN RIGHTS REALISM

53

mostly in terms of domestic US law and have thus not addressed with
the same frequency as non-US sovereigntists the peremptory status,
under international law, of the prohibition of atrocities previously
litigated under the ATS. However, when they do recognize the
importance of international respect for fundamental human rights,

they too resort to the substance/procedure distinction. Thus, in Jesner,
Justice Kennedy distinguished between international law duties and
the nature of the defendant (corporate or individual), noting that
"[t]he singular achievement of international law since the Second World War has
come in the area of human rights," where international law now imposes duties
on individuals as well as nation-states . . . . It does not follow, however, that
current principles of international law extend liability-civil or criminal-for
94
human-rights violations to corporations or other artificial entities.

Sovereigntists thus transport the UCJ debate to the abstract level
of legal categories of substance/prodedure, removing from immediate
view the harsh practical consequence of their position: the lack of
enforcement of one of the most important norms of international law.
Such formalism may serve to preserve courts' legitimacy. Yet, from a
normative realist perspective, where remedies are a core component of
rights, such a position is untenable. The strict divorce of rights and
remedies pays lip service to human rights values. Immunity in
principle "merely diverts"9 5 the victims' claim to a different mode of
settlement, yet, in practice, victims turn to civil litigation in foreign
courts precisely because no other redress is available in domestic and
international legal institutions. Upholding immunity in these cases
requires adopting a vision of law as an institution radically detached

from justice, as evidenced in one scholar's relegation of the victims'
claims to the realm of emotions that cannot form part of sound legal
96
analysis.
From a realist perspective, the position of sovereigntists in the
United States who object to UCJ primarily on grounds relating to the
separation of powers and comity towards foreign sovereigns is more

Jesner v. Arab Bank, PLC, 138 S. Ct. 1386, 1395-96 (2018) (citing Kiobel v.
94.
Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 621 F.3d 111, 118 (2d Cir. 2010)).
HAZEL Fox, THE LAW OF STATE IMMUNITY 525 (2004).
95.
Roger O'Keefe notes that though judges are not heartless, "most tend also to
96.
be conscious of the fact that a judicial forum is no guarantor of a happy ending and that,

as tragic as it may be, many morally deserving cases are lost." Roger O'Keefe, State
Immunity and Human Rights: Heads and Walls, Hearts and Minds, 44 VAND. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 999, 1032 (2011). Similarly, Stefan Talmon has rejected criticism of the
International Court of Justice's resort to the procedure/substance distinction in
JurisdictionalImmunities of the State by defending the formalism of law. Stefan Talmon,
Jus Cogens after Germany v. Italy: Substantive and ProceduralRules Distinguished, 25
LEIDEN J. INT'L L. 979, 1002 (2012).
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defensible, as it is grounded in a concern for practical consequences. 97

Nevertheless, that position is also unpersuasive: in practice, most if
not all impositions of legal accountability involve some reputational
damage to the state whose officials are held to account, potentially
affecting comity, and, hence, the separation of powers between the
judiciary and the political branches. To adopt these general political
concerns as criteria for the establishment of accountability
mechanisms is to subject accountability to the whims of state
discretion and consent, leaving the underlying human rights norms
rarely enforced in practice.
2. The Absolutist Human Rights Position: Remedies as Adjective to
Norms

Perhaps unsurprisingly given the ideological fervor surrounding
human rights, human rights advocates arguing for UCJ have adopted
a pure rights discourse that, as the rights discourse described by
Llewelyn, sees remedies as "adjective law," that is, as mechanically
accruing from the supremacy of human rights norms. This discourse
obscures the potential negative implications of remedy-seeking for
gross human rights abuses, implying that no limitations on remedies

for such abuses are justifiable.
This approach is clearly visible in debates surrounding the ATS.
In response to claims that human rights litigation under the ATS is an

undemocratic interference of the judicial branches in foreign policy,
human rights advocates argue that such litigation does not raise any
concerns as long as it is limited to norms of international law enjoying
international consensus. Put differently, by focusing on human rights

norms, human rights advocates shift attention away from the concrete
consequences of litigation. A prime example of this strategy can be seen
in Harold Koh's theory of transnational public law litigation, the
leading theoretical model of ATS litigation. 98 Koh recognizes that
ultimate resolution of the litigation often requires a political solution
to be negotiated among the various actors involved. 99 However,
because the theory attempts to justify transnational public law
litigation, it emphasizes the elaboration and internalization of
international law norms as central outcomes of the litigation. In order
to deal with concerns raised for comity toward foreign sovereigns, Koh

97.
I do not include in the category of "sovereigntists" those scholars who, like Ku
& Yoo, supra note 93, at 199-200, oppose UCJ under the ATS but would agree to UCJ in
state courts.
98.
For Koh, ATS litigation is a primary instance of "transnational public law
litigation," which merges classical domestic private' law litigation and classical
international litigation involving nation-states. HAROLD HONGJU KOH, TRANSNATIONAL
LITIGATION IN UNITED STATES COURTS 25 (2008).

99.
See Harold Hongju Koh, TransnationalLegal Process, 75 NEB. L. REv. 181,
199 (1996).
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invokes the universally accepted character of the norms litigated in
transnational public law litigation. 100 Koh then derives from this
argument about comity a rebuttal of concerns that ATS litigation
infringes on the separation of powers within the US government.101
Where the relevant international norms are the subject of clear
international consensus, US courts cannot be said to infringe on the

executive branches of the United States, since they are not really
intervening in other countries' affairs, and, by extension, in US foreign
affairs. 102 By shifting the discussion to universally accepted
international norms, Koh creates the illusion of a conflict-less world,
leaving unaddressed conservatives' pragmatic concerns about the
diplomatic strife caused by litigation.

Other scholars present remedies as "adjective" to norms by
arguing that there is no material distinction between the various
remedies, thereby obscuring the divergent consequences of the
different mechanisms. In a seminal article, Beth Stephens argued in
2002 that the differences between the United States and Europe in
response to human rights violations, namely the preference in Europe
for criminal proceedings, reflected different "'translation[s]' into
domestic law of identical international law mandates." 103 Similarly,
George Fletcher argued that UCJ is less controversial or problematic
than universal criminal jurisdiction, as the existence of principles of
conflicts of laws in tort cases-but not criminal cases-signifies that
universal jurisdiction is actually more compelling in the civil sphere
04
than in the criminal sphere.1 Justice Breyer put forward another

version of this argument in his concurrences in Sosa and Kiobel. He
argued that "universal criminal jurisdiction necessarily contemplates
a significant degree of civil tort recovery as well," since many countries
allow victims to file claims for compensation in the course of criminal
prosecutions. 105 Thus, he concludes, UCJ "would be no more
threatening" to comity among nations than universal criminal
jurisdiction, for which there is abundant normative consensus in his
view. 106
For Stephens, Fletcher, and Breyer, UCJ should not raise
concerns, as it is not substantially different from universal criminal
jurisdiction, which itself enjoys wide international acceptance. While
universal criminal jurisdiction may appear in some respects more
threatening to international relations than UCJ, because of the role of

100. See Harold Hongju Koh, TransnationalPublic Law Litigation, 100 YALE L.J.
2347, 2392 (1991).
101. Id. at 2387-88.
102. KOH, supra note 98, at 34.
103. Stephens, Translating, supra note 61, at 2-3.
104. FLETCHER, supra note 62, at 12-13.
105. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 763 (2004) (Breyer, J., concurring).
106. Id. at 762-63.
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forum state actors (prosecutors) and the severity of the criminal
sanction, the view of UCJ as milder in its effects is questionable. The
absence of prosecutors and the possibility of litigation even in the
defendant's absence from the jurisdiction once he has been served
mean that, if allowed, exercises of UCJ are much more likely to occur
than their criminal counterpart, multiplying concerns about foreign

relations complications. 107 Their view further ignores the specific
concerns raised by damage awards, which, as ATS litigation shows, can

rise to several billion US dollars in the event of a class action. A study
of the repercussions of In re Estate of Ferdinand E. Marcos in the
Philippines revealed that the large ATS damage award conflicted with

a transitional justice policy based on economic redistribution in the
post-Marcos era. 1 08
The strategy of proponents of UCJ in cases outside the United
States is, like their American colleagues, to adopt a pure rights
discourse in order to avoid addressing claims that the process of
litigation might have negative consequences. Echoing Koh's strategy,
dissenting Justice Abella in Kazemi invoked the universalityof the
litigated human rights norms to assuage fears of infringing on foreign
state sovereignty:

In the face of universal acceptance of the prohibition against
torture, concerns about any interference with sovereignty which may
be created by acting in judgment of an individual state official who
violates this prohibition necessarily shrink. The very nature of the
prohibition as a peremptory norm means that all states agree that
torture cannot be condoned.1 09
Moreover, proponents of UCJ argue that the supremacy of human
rights norms automatically bears a host of procedural consequences,
including that civil remedies for human rights abuses be made

available even in foreign countries." 0 Where opponents of UCJ refuse
to see a conflict between the prohibition of torture and immunity by
placing these rules in different categories (substantive and
procedural), proponents of UCJ see the prohibition of torture and
procedural rules relating to immunity as hierarchically related,
procedural rules being subordinate to peremptory substantive rules:

107. On private litigation's ability to multiply and reopen claims, see Karen Knop
& Annelise Riles, Space, Time, and Historical Injustice: A Feminist Conflict-of-Laws
Approach to the "Comfort Women"Agreement, 102 CORNELL L. REV. 853, 888 (2016).
108. Natalie R. Davidson, Alien Tort Statute Litigation and TransitionalJustice:
Bringing the Marcos CaseBack to the Philippines,11 INT'L J. TRANSNAT'L JUST. 257, 257,
266-68 (2017).
109. Kazemi Estate v. Islamic Republic of Iran (2014), 3 S.C.R 176, para. 229
(Can.).
110. Such a view was clearly expressed by the minority of the European Court of
Human Rights in Al-Adsani when it pointed out that "[t]he majority, while accepting
that the rule on the prohibition of torture is a jus cogens norm, refuse to draw the
consequences of such acceptance." Al-Adsani v. United Kingdom, 2001-XI Eur. Ct. H.R.
79 (Joint Dissenting Opinion 1 4).

57

HUMAN RIGHTS REALISM

20211

.

It is not the nature of the proceedings which determines the effects that a jus
cogens rule has upon another rule of international law, but the character of the
rule as a peremptory norm and its interaction with a hierarchically lower rule.
111
The criminal or civil nature of the domestic proceedings is immaterial.

Reduced to "adjective law," remedies are presented as automatic
and unproblematic.
When proponents of UCJ do acknowledge sovereigntists' political
concerns, they quickly dismiss them as nonlegal and, hence, not
properly raised in legal argumentation. In Nait-Litman, the dissenting
judges dismissed potential diplomatic difficulties posed by exercises of
argument" 112 and "not a legal
UCJ as "a non-judicial
113
Discussing state immunity in foreign courts for
[consideration]."
torture, Lorna McGregor similarly characterized dignity and comity as
"stand[ing] outside the legal regime" 114 and noted that comity is
1 15
nothing more than "rules of politeness, convenience, and goodwill."
Political concerns are either avoided through a single-minded focus on
norm promotion or conveniently dismissed as nonlegal and, hence, not

in conflict with UCJ in a relevant manner.
This position is no more convincing than the sovereigntists'
position. The international normative consensus about the prohibition
of torture invoked by proponents of UCJ is an inadequate, formal
answer to concerns that comity toward foreign sovereigns is harmed,
in practice, by exercises of UCJ. The view that consensus about norms
implies consent to a range of remedies, including UCJ, is tenable only

to the extent that one sees remedies as substantively meaningless.
That understanding of remedies is belied by the very practical

consequences of litigation revealed by the UCJ cases. Some cases point
to diplomatic conflict or to the inability to enter into interstate
negotiations between the forum state and the state whose officials or
116
Other cases
corporations are being sued as a result of the litigation.
point to conflicts between ATS litigation and economic distribution and
restorative justice. As indicated above, the damage award in the

Marcos ATS case conflicted with a transitional justice policy in the

111. Id.
112. Nait-Liman v. Switzerland, App. No. 51357/07 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Mar. 15, 2018)
(Dedov, J., dissenting).
113. Id. 1 98 (Serghides, J., dissenting).
114.

Lorna

McGregor,

Torture and State Immunity:

Deflecting Impunity,

Distorting Sovereignty, 18 EUR. J. INT'L L. 903, 917 (2007).
115. Id. at 918 (quoting IAN BRoWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL
LAW 28 (6th ed. 2003)).
116. In Jesner, Justice Kennedy noted that the litigation "has caused significant
diplomatic tensions with Jordan for more than a decade." Jesner v. Arab Bank, PLC, 138
S. Ct. 1386, 1399 (2018). In Al-Adsani, Justice Pellonpad and Justice Bratza discussed
the risks posed by litigation to settlement arrangements and cooperation between states.
Al-Adsani v. United Kingdom, 2001-XI Eur. Ct. H.R. 79, 107-10 (Pelonpai & Bratza,
JJ., concurring).
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Philippines based on economic redistribution. 117 In the early 2000s,
the South African government initially opposed ATS lawsuits filed

against multinational corporations for aiding and abetting South
African apartheid, arguing that the damages sought conflicted with its
policy of economic

growth in partnership

with corporations.

118

Exercises of UCJ clash with amnesties, which are a necessary
component of restorative justice. 119 While some of these political
repercussions might not justify limiting the availability of remedies for
gross abuses, they expose the fallacy in the argument that legal
accountability for gross human rights abuses merely enforces rights.
C. Sovereigntism and Human Rights Absolutism Beyond Universal
Civil Jurisdiction
This subpart shows that the sovereigntist and human rights
absolutist positions are also prevalent in commentary on other
transnational accountability mechanisms.
The sovereigntist position is clearly expressed in states' opposition

to the ICC and not only in crude critiques of the court voiced by
authoritarian rulers, such as Rodrigo Duterte. 12 0 The United States'
consistent refusal to join the Rome Statute since the administration of
Bill Clinton unless cases would be screened by the Security Council
demonstrates that the United States' "understanding of 'international
society' . . . is limited to 'a society of states."' 121 Sovereigntism is also
expressed in the limitations enacted in domestic legislation on
universal criminal jurisdiction. According to M.ximo Langer's
persuasive analysis, the number of worldwide prosecutions under
universal criminal jurisdiction has not declined in the past three

117.
118.

Davidson, supra note 108.
See generally Charles P. Abrahams, Lessons from the South African
Experience, in CORPORATE ACCOUNTABILITY IN THE CONTEXT OF TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE
153 (Sabine Michalowski ed., 2013).
119. See Jennifer Llewellyn, Just Amnesty and Private International Law, in
TORTURE AS TORT: COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES ON THE DEVELOPMENT
TRANSNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LITIGATION 567, 567 (Craig Scott ed., 2001).

OF

120. After the ICC opened a preliminary inquiry into allegations that Philippine
officials committed crimes against humanity in killing thousands of individuals accused
of being drug dealers or users, President Rodrigo Duterte accused the court of violating
"due process and the presumption of innocence" and announced that the Philippines was
withdrawing from the Rome Treaty, with immediate effect. Referred to a provision in the
statute giving a withdrawal effect one year after it is submitted, Mr. Duterte replied that
provision was invalid because there had been "fraud" when the Philippines joined the
treaty. Felipe Villamor, Philippines Plans to Withdraw from International Criminal
Court,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Mar.
14,
2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/14/world/asia/rodrigo-duterte-philippines-ice.html
[https://perma.cc/LN5F-AQFF] (archived Sep. 22, 2020).
Cosmopolitan and American Democracy:
121. Jason Ralph, Between
Understanding US Opposition to the International Criminal Court, 17 INT'L REL. 195,
196 (2003) (citing HEDLEY BULL, THE ANARCHICAL SOCIETY: A STUDY OF ORDER IN
WORLD POLITICS (1977)).
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decades. Instead of the common perception of a "rise and fall" of this
mechanism, he identifies a shift in universal criminal jurisdiction

legislation from a conception of the state as "global enforcer" of
international norms to one in which the state will exercise this form of
jurisdiction only to avoid providing a safe haven to the perpetrators of
atrocities. 122 The rejection of the broader "global enforcer" model
reflects sovereigntists sensibilities, in that it is motivated by the wish
of the executive and legislative branches of government to avoid high
23
costs in terms of international relations.1
The human rights absolutist position has nevertheless
encountered a large measure of success. If challenged today, the
arrangement reached in South Africa would likely be held contrary to
the state duty to prosecute and provide compensation for serious
human rights abuses elaborated by various treaty bodies. 124 The
absolutist human rights position can also be found in interpretations
of rules applicable to the ICC. Under Article 17 of the Rome Statute, a

case is admissible where there are no relevant legal proceedings, or
where domestic proceedings have been initiated but the state is
unwilling or unable to genuinely prosecute. 125 While Article 17
requires an investigation or prosecution for a case to be held
inadmissible, it does not expressly require a criminal investigation.
However, it is not clear that an amnesty would preclude ICC
jurisdiction, given that section 6 of the Preamble of the Rome Statute
states "that it is the duty of every State to exercise its criminal
6
jurisdiction over those responsible for international crimes."12 The

Office of the Prosecutor has, in addition, interpreted another relevant
provision of the statute in accordance with the absolutist human rights

122. Hence one limitation in the legislation is that the defendant must be a
permanent resident of the forum state. Maximo Langer, Universal Jurisdiction is Not
Disappearing:The Shift from 'GlobalEnforcer'to No Safe Haven' Universal Jurisdiction,
13 J. INT'L CRIM. JUST. 245, 251 (2015).
123. Id. at 253-54.
124.

Such is the opinion of Argentine human rights lawyer and former U.N.

Special Rapporteur on Torture, Juan Mendez. See Juan E. M6ndez, Foreword to
AMNESTY IN THE AGE OF HUMAN RIGHTS ACCOUNTABILITY: COMPARATIVE AND
INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES, at xvii, xxiii (Francesca Lessa & Leigh A. Payne eds.,

Cambridge Univ. Press 2012), cited in Engle, supra note 11, at 1085. Amnesties for
serious human rights violations have been held incompatible with a state duty to
prosecute by the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, the Human Rights Committee

(monitoring the implementation of the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights) and the Committee against Torture, among other bodies. For a review of these
decisions see Gomes Lund v. Brazil, Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations, and
Costs, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 219, ¶¶ 147-70 (Nov. 24, 2010).
125. Because of the sharp clash of views on amnesties during negotiations of the
Rome Statute, the drafters of the statute left the matter ambiguous, neither explicitly
requiring criminal prosecution as the only acceptable response in all cases nor creating
an explicit exception for amnesties. Robinson, supra note 17, at 483.
126. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, July 17, 1998, 2187
U.N.T.S. 1-38544 [hereinafter Rome Statute].
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position. Under Article 53 of the Rome Statute, the prosecutor may
decide to not pursue a case based on the determination that an
investigation or case would not serve the "interests of justice." The
Office of the Prosecutor has given a very narrow interpretation to that
provision, insisting that "the text and purpose of the Rome Statute
clearly favour the pursuit of investigations and cases when those
investigations and cases are admissible and the relevant standard of
proof can be satisfied" and distinguishing the interests of justice from
the interests of peace.1 2 7 Similarly to commentators on UCJ dismissing
comity as an extralegal consideration, in this view, political
considerations are not to form part of legal analysis by court
personnel.1 28

dominates
absolutism
human
rights
broadly,
More
nongovernmental human rights organizations' (NGOs) struggle
against "anti-impunity," 12 9 itself a term implying that the punishment
of individual perpetrators is self-evidently desirable. Emblematic of
this stance is the opposition of international NGO Human Rights
Watch to the peace agreement reached in Colombia between the state
and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia, on the grounds that
the proposed agreement absolved perpetrators of human rights abuses
of legal responsibility. 130

127. Office of the Prosecutor, Policy Paper on the Interests of Justice, 2, I.C.C. Doc.
ICC-OTP-2007 (Sep. 2, 2007), https://www.icc-cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/772C95C9-F54D4321-BF09-73422BB23528/143640/ICCOTPInterestsOfJustice.pdf (last visited Oct. 14,
2020) [https://perma.ccIU2TZ-MDUS] (archived Oct. 14, 2020). The Office of the
Prosecutor justified this position by referring to Article 16 of the Rome Statute, which
allows the Security Council to defer an ICC investigation or prosecution for renewable
periods of 12 months under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations
(maintenance of peace). Id. at 8.
128. The court itself appears to take a different view. On 12 April 2019, the PreTrial Chamber rejected the Prosecutor's request to authorize her to open a formal
investigation into crimes against humanity and war crimes allegedly committed in
Afghanistan, on the grounds that an investigation "at this stage would not serve the
interests of justice" given instability on the ground, the "lack of cooperation of relevant
resources." Situation in the Islamic Republic of
parties," and the ICC's "limited ...
Afghanistan, Case No. ICC-02/17, Pre-Trial Chamber II, 16, 31, 32 (Apr. 12 2019),
https://www.icc-cpi.int/CourtRecords/CR2019_02068.PDF (last visited Oct. 13, 2020)
[https://perma.cc/TJP3-EYDR] (archived Oct. 13, 2020). Among the outraged critiques of
this decision, can be found the human rights absolutist position that political
considerations should never come to bear in the administration of accountability for
atrocity. See, for example, Sergey Vasiliev's assertion that the Chamber's "treatment of
the 'interests of justice' requirement went astray, bringing legally irrelevant desiderata
within the judicial determination." Sergey Vasiliev, Not Just Another 'Crisis':Could the
Blocking of the Afghanistan Investigation Spell the End of the ICC? (PartI), EJIL: TALK!
(Apr. 19, 2019), https://www.ejiltalk.org/not-just-another-crisis-could-the-blocking-of[https://perma.cc/ZH4Tthe-afghanistan-investigation-spell-the-end-of-the-icc-part-i/
LE34] (archived Oct. 13, 2020).
129. See generally Engle, supranote 11.
130. Diego Acosta Arcarazo, Russell Buchan & Rene Uruefia, Beyond Justice,
Beyond Peace? Colombia, the Interests of Justice, and the Limits of International
Criminal Law, 26 CRIM. L.F. 291, 304-05 (2015).
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As in the debate on UCJ, the sovereigntist position on these
mechanisms bars legal accountability by narrowing or eliminating
courts' jurisdiction, or subordinates it to the will of sovereign states,
emptying international norms of force. The human rights absolutist

position, for its part, sees legal accountability as automatically
applicable and excludes political considerations from the realm of legal

analysis. In doing so, human rights advocates not only fail to address
sovereigntists' concerns adequately, they also fail to acknowledge that
in some cases legal accountability might actually create a dilemma
from a human rights perspective, if one understands "human rights" to
include not only backward-looking individual justice but also the
promotion and protection of human rights going forward. It is thus
essential for human rights advocates to cease denying that legal

accountability has political consequences. The next Part provides a
normative justification and outline of a framework for analyzing
limitations to accountability mechanisms for human rights abuses.

IV. RECONSTRUCTING HUMAN RIGHTS REALISM
The previous Part showed that neither sovereigntist nor
absolutist human rights position is tenable. Yet each puts forth valid
considerations. The absolutist human rights position takes seriously
the concept of human rights in Ronald Dworkin's sense of viewing
rights as trumps over other considerations. 131 The sovereigntist
position takes seriously the political implications of accountability.
This Part argues that it is possible to take seriously both the legal right
and its political consequences, under a position this Article terms
"human rights realism." Under this position, human rights norms
enjoy a superior status in relation to other international legal norms,
and thus legal accountability for human rights violations is the point
of departure (though the desirability and justifications for the
existence of any particular type of legal mechanism must be debated
and assessed). However, even for those legal mechanisms that are
normatively justified, their availability should be limited to avoid those
32
political implications that undermine core human rights.1
Part IV will illustrate this approach in various institutional
contexts. For the purposes of this Part, it suffices to clarify that, with
respect to UCJ, this approach could be operationalized in the following

131.

See RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 192 (1977) (discussing

man's right to disobey laws that infringe his rights).
132. The term "core human right" is defined and justified in Section IV.B.
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way: the objection of a foreign state 133 to an exercise of UCJ on the
grounds that it undermines peace negotiations or measures furthering
economic equality would preclude the taking of jurisdiction by the court

in the particular case, where the court is convinced both that the
negotiations or conflicting measures are genuine and substantially
threatened by the exercise of UCJ. 134 However, mere diplomatic
difficulties between the forum and the state where the abuses occurred
would not bar the taking of jurisdiction.

This Part is devoted to justifying the proposed approach, human
rights realism. Because this approach assumes the virtue of human
rights norms generally, this Part does not delve into the justifications

for enforcing those norms, taking the necessity of generally enforcing
them as a given. Neither does it discuss the justifications for choosing

criminal or civil law as means of enforcement. Various considerations
such as legal pluralism and the quality of historical clarification (in

particular the focus on individual perpetrators as opposed to structures
of violence) may guard against privileging criminal and civil responses

to atrocity 135 and cannot be adequately addressed within the
framework of this Article. Instead, this Article argues that even if the
transnational remedies for atrocity currently privileged in
international law-criminal prosecution and compensation-are
normatively justified, a realist concern for the practical implications of
remedy-seeking requires accepting gaps between human rights norms

and remedies when those gaps protect core human rights.
A. The Benefits of Gaps Between Human Rights Norms and Remedies
Part I established that to adopt a realist approach mindful of the
concrete social consequences of legal interventions requires not only to
strive for the granting of remedies but also to account in legal design
for the consequences of remedy-seeking itself. Where remedy-seeking
produces negative consequences for human welfare, it should not be
accepted unquestioningly. Are any such costs sometimes produced by
exercises of the transnational accountability mechanisms discussed in
this Article? The question matters, for if such costs are never produced
or are negligible, there is no justification for even beginning to discuss
gaps between rights and remedies. Based on an analysis of empirical
and social scientific scholarship, this Part argues that full legal
accountability for human rights abuses can have negative concrete

133. Even when states are not defendants in litigation, as was the case in most
ATS cases, they have been able to express their position on exercises of UCJ by
submitting amicus curiae briefs.
134. In 2001, Jennifer Llewellyn considered the conflict between UCJ and
amnesties, and argued that courts should defer to those amnesties furthering restorative
justice. Llewellyn, supra note 119.
135.

ANTI-IMPUNITY AND THE HUMAN RIGHTS AGENDA, supra note 25.
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consequences, and that imperfect enforcement enables contextualized,
and more effective, domestic mobilizations of human rights norms.
A number of studies point to the costs of full enforcement of
accountability mechanisms. A study of the domestic repercussion of the

Fildrtiga and Marcos ATS litigation reveals that UCJ can empower
6
subordinate groups to challenge power structures.13 However, this

type of litigation does not always have positive effects. The MarcosATS
lawsuit conflicted with a policy of economic redistribution. Marcos was

a class action against Ferdinand Marcos brought on behalf of 10,000

37
Philippine victims of torture, disappearance, and execution.1 It had
led to a full jury trial and damage awards in 1994 and 1995 totaling
approximately $2 billion.1 38 In order to enforce their damage awards,
the plaintiffs sought to attach various assets around the world held for

the benefit of the Marcos estate.1 39 They soon faced competing claims
from the Republic of the Philippines, whose primary transitional
justice policy had been to recover the billions of dollars stolen from

national coffers by the Marcoses and use the recovered assets to combat
40
Courts in various
economic inequality through land redistribution.1
jurisdictions, including the U.S. Supreme Court, ruled against the ATS
plaintiffs by reference to the Philippines' sovereign immunity.141 It is

safe to conclude that had they not done so-that is, had the
multibillion-dollar damage award been fully enforced-the plaintiffs'
enforcement of their damage award would have precluded the funding
42
of the Republic's redistributive policy.1
While conflicts with distributive justice might appear most likely
in exercises of UCJ as a form of civil litigation geared toward the grant
of damages, they can also be produced by the other mechanisms
considered here. The imperative of criminal prosecution furthered by
international criminal law and the state duty to prosecute developed
by regional human rights courts has distributional implications, in
that, to comply with complementarity or regional court rulings
requiring prosecutions or compensation, funds may have to be diverted
from other state programs. 143 However, the more likely and
criminal
of international
consequence
negative
troublesome

See generally NATALIE R. DAVIDSON, AMERICAN TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE:
136.
WRITING COLD WAR HISTORY IN HUMAN RIGHTS LITIGATION 78-179 (2020).
See, e.g., id. at 104-79.
137.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Id.

142. Id. See generally Philippines v. Pimentel, 553 U.S. 851 (2008) for the
particular Supreme Court ruling in this case.
143. This point has been made by both economists and critical scholars in relation
to transitional justice mechanisms generally. See Geoff Dancy & Eric WiebelhausBrahm, Bridge to Human Development or Vehicle of Inequality? TransitionalJustice and
Economic Structures, 9 INT'L J. TRANSITIONAL JUST. 51, 53-54 (2015).
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mechanisms is the much-debated risk of conflict with peace. In an
economic analysis of universal criminal jurisdiction,

one author

persuasively argued that, by allowing all nations to prosecute human
rights violations even when unconnected to the forum state, universal
criminal jurisdiction makes it difficult for individual states to transact
their entitlements to prosecute in peace negotiations as nonprosecution

can never be guaranteed. 14 4 Analysing a data set of civil conflicts from
2002 to 2013, Alyssa Prorok found that active ICC involvement in a
conflict decreases the likelihood of conflict termination when the threat
of domestic punishment faced by leaders is low. 14 5 In an earlier study
analysing a database of regime transitions from 1998 to 2007, Monica

Nalepa and Emilia Justyna Powell found that the combination of a
state's ratification of the Rome Statute and ratification by states in its
region deters dictators' decisions to peacefully relinquish power when
the dictator faces a violent opposition willing to afford the dictator
46
amnesty in exchange for stepping down.1

One of the challenges of legal realism is that it relies on social
scientific scholarship to understand the impact of legal interventions,
yet social science is rife with debates and disagreements. This means
not only that the legal realist must revisit the law in light of changing
conditions and findings but that her choice of empirical findings must

be justified. This Article accepts that full legal accountability can
sometimes negatively impact peace based on the fact that scholars
from diverse theoretical and professional backgrounds, using a wide
range of methodologies, are beginning to converge on these issues.1 47

It is true that international relations scholars continue to debate the
overall influence of international criminal justice on peacemaking. 148

Yet even the most fervent defenders of international criminal justice
among those scholars admit that, under some conditions, peacemaking

144. Eugene Kontorovich, The Inefficiency of Universal Jurisdiction,2008 U. ILL.
L. REV. 389, 389.
145. Alyssa K. Prorok, The (In)compatibility of Peace and Justice? The
InternationalCriminalCourt and Civil Conflict Termination, 71 INT'L ORG. 213, 228-31
(2017).
146. Monika Nalepa & Emilia Justyna Powell, The Role of Domestic Opposition
and InternationalJustice Regimes in Peaceful Transitions of Power, 60 J. CONFLICT
REsoL. 1191, 1191 (2016).
147. See id. See generally Kontorovich, supra note 144; Prorok, supra note 145.
Sarah Nouwen and Wouter Werner have also persuasively shown that the universalist
language employed by the ICC has exacerbated the friend/enemy distinction in Uganda
and Sudan. Sarah M. H. Nouwen & Wouter G. Werner, Doing Justice to the Political:
The International Criminal Court in Uganda and Sudan, 21 EUR. J. INT'L L. 941, 941
(2010). While this could be taken as an indication that conflict has shifted from arms to
the realm of law, it may plausibly signal that international criminal law exacerbates the
social and political conditions for violent conflict.
148. Jo & Simmons, supra note 37, at 445-46. On the difficulties of assessing the
impact of transitional justice measures, see generally ASSESSING THE IMPACT OF
TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE: CHALLENGES FOR EMPIRIcAL RESEARCH (Hugo Van Der Merwe,

Victoria Baxter & Audrey R. Chapman eds., 2009).
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efforts can be harmed. 149 As will be detailed in Part IV, systemic
limitations to accountability require a high degree of certainty based
on more extensive evidence than is currently available. The present
discussion of empirical studies does not imply that all limitations to
accountability that purport to further peace are justified. More
modestly, for the purposes of this Part, the existing empirical evidence
substantiates the notion that full legal accountability can, in some

cases,

impede

peace-making,

and,

therefore,

that

full

legal

accountability cannot be presumed to be desirable across the board.

Moreover, some empirical studies which purport to challenge the
view that legal accountability mechanisms endanger peace ultimately
confirm the view that gaps between norms and remedies can be

beneficial. Notably, in a recent study of the parts played by the ICC
and the Inter-American Court of Human Rights in the Colombian

peace process, Courtney Hillebrecht, Alexandra Huneeus, and Sandra
Borda argue that legal accountability norms should not be viewed with
concern, as in practice they are not applied directly but rather
150
Thus, while
reinterpreted by various domestic actors in novel ways.

the Colombian peace process was highly judicialized, the peace accords
reinterpreted criminal accountability by disaggregating it into
components and allowing punishment to be waived to further
restorative justice, thereby resolving the conflict between peace and
justice. This finding is in line with scholarship on the importance of
domestic mobilization of human rights mechanisms 151 and
anthropological theories of the local "translation" of human rights
norms. 152 Yet what the study also reveals is that such a translation of
the norm of criminal accountability was enabled by limitations on

accountability at the international level: drafters of the peace
agreement relied on the Inter-American Court ruling in Massacre of El

Mozote and Nearby Places v. El Salvador, which recognized a state
obligation to make peace as part of its commitment to human rights,

149. See Jo & Simmons, supranote 37, at 445 ("There may be some cases in which
the unreasonable insistence on prosecution could be antithetical to the more practical
idea of making deals and compromising with atrocity offenders, and we do not deny that
carefully calibrated amnesties may in some circumstances support peace processes ...
.").

150.

See Hillebrecht, Huneeus & Borda, supra note 18, at 280-81.

151.

See BETH A. SIMMONS, MOBILIZING FOR HUMAN RIGHTS: INTERNATIONAL LAW

IN DOMESTIC POLITICS 125-26 (2009); Xinyuan Dai, The "Compliance Gap" and the
Efficacy of International Human Rights Institutions, in THE PERSISTENT POWER OF
HUMAN RIGHTS: FROM COMMITMENT TO COMPLIANCE 85, 100-01 (Thomas Risse, Stephen

C. Ropp & Kathryn Sikkink eds., 2013).
152. See Sally Engle Merry, Transnational Human Rights and Local Activism:
Mapping the Middle, 108 AM. ANTHROPOLOGIST 38, 38-39 (2006); SALLY ENGLE MERRY,
HUMAN RIGHTS AND GENDER VIOLENCE: TRANSLATING INTERNATIONAL LAW INTO LOCAL
JUSTICE 6-7 (2006); SHANNON SPEED, RIGHTS IN REBELLION: INDIGENOUS STRUGGLE AND
HUMAN RIGHTS IN CHIAPAS 19 (2008) (examining how local actors in Chiapas, Mexico,
reinterpret human rights).
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and, hence, enabled peace-making to be balanced against
accountability. 153 Moreover, the authors insist that the peace
negotiations operated in the shadow of the law rather than in
conditions of perfect enforcement.1 54 Similarly, a study of the Marcos
case reveals that the ATS damage award against Marcos triggered
reparations legislation-the domestic "translation" of the ATS
lawsuit-precisely because of difficulties enforcing the award in courts
around the world because of the precedence given to sovereign
immunity over human rights enforcement.1 55 These studies suggest
that, for international law to play its "shadow" role and allow
contextualized domestic reinterpretations of international norms that
avoid conflicts with peace or economic redistribution, international
legal norms should be imperfectly enforced. In fact, scholars
increasingly point to the importance of weak enforcement of human
rights norms at the international level as a condition of effective
domestic mobilization and reinterpretation.1 56
Thus, by fully granting transnational remedies, foreign and
international courts would not merely be "giving teeth" to international
human rights norms, as argued by human rights advocates, but also
potentially limiting the ability of political communities around the
world to engage in peace-making and forms of justice alternative to
retributive and corrective justice. These consequences can be grave for
human welfare, and, therefore, cannot be accepted unquestioningly.
Yet under what circumstances can these consequences justify limiting
the remedies available for gross human rights abuses?
B. Determining the Extent of the Gaps
What costs should count as relevanit? In the private law context,
Smith views the exercise of state violence and the use of public funds
as costs that justify the existence of gaps between rights and remedies.
However, at least in the human rights context, some more precise
criterion must be developed to determine which costs can limit
accountability. Transnational human rights enforcement necessarily
entails some costs, if only the reputational costs to the state held liable

&

153. Massacres of El Mozote and Nearby Places v. El Salvador, Merits,
Reparations, and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 252, ¶T 37-38 (Oct.
25, 2012) (Diego Garcia-Sayan, J., concurring), as discussed in Hillebrecht, Huneeus
Borda, supra note 18, at 300.
154. Hillebrecht, Huneeus & Borda, supra note 18, at 287.
155. Davidson, supra note 108, at 268-69.
156. See Dai, supra note 151, at 95 (viewing international human rights
instruments as intentionally weak instruments); Grainne de Bdrca, Human Rights
Experimentalism, 111 AM. J. INT'L L. 277, 280 (2017) (arguing that enforcement
weakness is required for international human rights law to function properly as a system
of experimental governance in which stakeholders at the periphery reinterpret and
mobilize the norms).
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for abuses (including through its officials). If all costs or harms were to
count as relevant, human rights norms could never be enforced.
Thus, some criterion must be developed to filter those political
consequences that cannot legitimately limit remedies for human rights
abuses. When developing an interest-balancing approach to remedies
for human rights violations before international courts, Sonja Starr
draws on the work of US constitutional lawyer Paul Gewirtz, who
argues that interests that conflict with the underlying right cannot be
part of interest-balancing. 157 Under this approach, an interest in

maintaining racial segregation cannot be taken into account by courts
in desegregation cases. 158 However, that approach only excludes those
costs that, under the approach developed by Smith, are already
excluded: the costs of respecting the underlying right itself (the "costs"
of not committing torture). The question is, among the broad range of
additional costs triggered by remedy-seeking, which costs to accept as
legitimate?
In order to both respect norms prohibiting egregious violations of
human rights and avoid negative consequences of remedy-seeking, this
Article proposes that legal accountability be limited only to avoid a
threat to what this Article calls a "core human right." By "core human
right" this Article refers to the right to be free from the atrocity that
triggers transnational accountability mechanisms (such as torture,
crimes against humanity, war crimes, and genocide), as well as to the
right to life, which the Human Rights Committee views as "the
supreme right . . . whose effective protection is the prerequisite for the
159
Under this proposal, the
enjoyment of all other human rights."

political consequences of imposing legal accountability can be taken
into account to limit accountability if and only if those political
consequences, in effect, threaten core human rights as so defined. The
word "threat" is to be understood broadly to include more than the
threat of an immediate, direct act of atrocity or violation of the right to
life. Instead, it is sufficient to substantiate the conditions necessary, in

practice, for the commission of egregious violations, such as a threat to
peace or economic equality. To recall the illustration provided at the
beginning of this Part, the objection of a foreign state to an exercise of
UCJ on the grounds that it undermines peace negotiations or economic
equality would preclude the taking of jurisdiction in the particular case
where the court is convinced both that the negotiations or conflicting
measure is genuine and substantially threatened by the exercise of

157. Sonja B. Starr, Rethinking "Effective Remedies": Remedial Deterrence in
InternationalCourts, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 693, 761-62 (2008) (referring to Paul Gewirtz,
Remedies and Resistance, 92 YALE L.J. 585, 606-07 (1983)).
158. Id.
159. Human Rights Comm., General Comment No. 36 (2018) on Article 6 of the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, on the Right to Life, ¶ 2, U.N. Doc.
CCPR/C/GC/36 (Oct. 30, 2018).

68

ANDERBIL TJOURNAL OF TRANSNA TIONAL LAW

[vOL. 54:31

UCJ. However, mere diplomatic difficulties between the forum and the

state where the abuses occurred would not bar the taking of
jurisdiction.

The principal justification for these limitations to accountability
is the realist desire to avoid counterproductive applications of the law.
Indeed, these limitations arguably further the underlying purpose of

protecting human rights better than legal accountability itself. This
argument assumes that remedies for human rights abuses do not only
have a corrective rationale but also a forward-looking objective of
protecting individuals from future human rights violations, whether
through deterrence or the enunciation of norms. This presupposition is

correct as a description of the social practice of human rights: human
rights advocates often invoke the deterrent or norm-clarifying
rationales of legal accountability. 160 The view that legal accountability
prevents future violations is also enshrined in the preamble of the
Rome Statute, which announces that the state parties are
"[d]etermined to put an end to impunity for the perpetrators of these
crimes and thus to contribute to the prevention of such crimes."1 61 This
assumption is also normatively compelling. It would be highly
antiegalitarian to enforce international human rights norms in total
disregard of the enforcement's effect on the basic rights of individuals
who are not victims. The argument here is that, based on the empirical
scholarship surveyed in the previous subpart, this forward-looking
aspect of the legal remedy may sometimes be undermined by legal
accountability. The proposed limitations thus seek to avoid situations
where the law is counterproductive and negatively affects the
conditions for the enjoyment of the human rights it seeks to protect. In
other words, the proposed limitations are tethered to the norms
underlying the remedies.
Yet it remains to be explained why this approach should be limited
to threats to core human rights-the right to life and the right to be
free from atrocities-to the exclusion of other human rights, and other
values beyond human rights. In addition, why adopt such a broad
definition of threats to core human rights to include threats to peace
and economic equality?

160. With respect to UCJ, see Beth Van Schaack, With All Deliberate Speed: Civil
Human Rights Litigation as a Tool for Social Change, 57 VAND. L. REV. 2305, 2331-34
(2004). With respect to the ICC, the Court's prosecutor Fatou Bensouda has stated that
"we hope to deter the commission of future crimes, and provide some comfort to
survivors, restore dignity to lives devastated by atrocity crimes, and honour the memory
of those whose lives have been lost. We must never forget the victims. We must work to
prevent future victimization." Press Release, The Prosecutor of the International
Criminal Court, Fatou Bensouda, Visits Niger, Addresses National Assembly: We Must
(Apr.
28,
2017),
https://www.iccForget
the
Victims
Never
cpi.int/Pages/item.aspx?name=PR1300 [https://perma.cc[H2JD-PLGS] (archived Sept.
16, 2020).
161. Rome Statute, supra note 126.
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The limitation to human rights, to the exclusion of values that
may be categorized as outside the purview of human rights (such as
diplomatic tension), reflects the fact that the proposed approach is
firmly located within human rights advocacy and takes human rights
162
It
norms as the starting point of the international legal system.
assumes the superiority of human rights over other norms, and, by
recognizing only those limitations to accountability that are related to
human rights, gives meaning to that hierarchy. This type of limitation

will not be familiar to students of legal realism; realists accepted
various social policies as constraints on legal design. The exclusive
character of the limitation, to human rights values only, is an
adjustment required by this Article's marriage of legal realism with
the view that human rights norms are superior to other norms.
Of course, many human rights recognized in international law are

subject to limitation clauses that give precedence to a range of values,
some of which are difficult to justify in terms of human rights, such as
63
the protection of public order or public morals.1 When protecting
human rights in general, international law justifiably allows rights to
give way to other values at times. However, this Article concerns only
remedies for violations of human rights considered absolute, such as
the right to be free from torture, slavery, and other atrocity crimes.

Violations of these rights cannot be justified by reference to other
values. While the realist approach developed here mandates accepting
limitations to remedies for their breach, the proposed rules on remedies
nevertheless reflect the normative hierarchy embedded in the
prohibitions.
This normative hierarchy also explains why the proposed
limitation is to core human rights as opposed to all human rights: this
limitation reflects assumptions about the heightened gravity of torture
and other atrocity crimes in comparison with other human rights
violations and of the right to life in comparison with other norms. This
limitation is also geared to avoiding a definition of human rights so

broad as to be meaningless. Human rights are notoriously vague, and

162.

Anne Peters, The Merits of Global Constitutionalism, 16 IND. J. GLOBAL

LEGAL STUD. 397, 398 (2009).
163. See, for instance, article 8(2) of the European Convention on Human Rights,
protecting the right to respect for private and family life, which provides that:
There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this
right except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a
democratic society in the interests of national security, public safety or the
economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for
the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms
of others.
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms art.
8(2), Apr. 11, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221.
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many contrary interests could be conceptualized as human rights
values, thus allowing human rights enforcement to be trumped easily.
For instance, in Al-Adsani, ECHR concurring judges Pelonpaa and
Bratza invoked the financial and administrative burdens that would
be imposed on forum states "which so far have been most liberal in

accepting refugees and asylum-seekers" if a torture exception to
immunity from civil proceedings were recognized, as those states
"would have had imposed upon them the additional burden of
guaranteeing access to a court for the determination of perhaps
hundreds of refugees' civil claims for compensation for alleged
torture." 16 4 Were human rights realism interpreted to allow threats to
all human rights to limit accountability for atrocity, Pelonpaa and
Bratza's

concern

would

arguably

justify

preserving

sovereign

immunity (at least in forum states with significant refugee
populations) in order to avoid diminishing state funding for social
programs such as education, health, and culture (i.e., programs that
can be presented as furthering the human rights to education, health,
and culture). Requiring that the criteria be in furtherance of the
protection of core human rights preempts states from arguing that

every countervailing interest is a human rights interest. This does not
mean that the list of core human rights is frozen in time and only
includes those rights recognized as triggering transnational
accountability mechanisms at the time of writing. To the extent that
under international law, the category of core human rights is
expanded-whether by including additional norms in the list of norms

grave enough to trigger universal jurisdiction; ICC jurisdiction; or a
state duty to investigate, prosecute, and compensate; or by interpreting

more broadly recognized norms such as torture so as to include forms
of violence hitherto considered less grave'ls-the category of core
human rights should accordingly be expanded for the purposes of
limiting accountability.

The broad understanding of what constitutes a threat to core
human rights, to include threats to peace and economic equality,
primarily reflects realism's pragmatism. Pragmatism requires seeking

out the conditions undermining rights rather than waiting to formally
identify breaches (or imminent threats of breaches) of rights. These two
phenomena-conflict and economic inequality-offer fertile ground for
the breach of core human rights. Armed conflict unquestionably
provides the conditions for the commission of atrocity and certainly

&

164. Al-Adsani v. United Kingdom, 2001-XI Eur. Ct. H.R. 79, 107 (Pelonpaa
Bratza, JJ., concurring).
165. On the expanded interpretation of torture to include domestic violence, see
generally Davis, supra note 58; Natalie R. Davidson, The Feminist Expansion of the
Prohibition of Torture: Towards a Post-Liberal InternationalHuman Rights Law?, 52
CoRNELL INT'L L.J. 109 (2019).
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166
In addition, according to many
infringements of the right to life.

scholars,

economic inequalities are at the root of much mass

atrocity. 167

Yet

domestic

alternatives

to

criminal

accountability, such as restorative justice measures,
necessary elements of peace and redistribution.

and

civil

are often

This proposal also furthers contextualism. As argued in Part I,
domestic institutions' proximity to the site of the abuses makes them

well placed to assess the contextual application of remedies and to
determine whether atrocity prevention might not, in the short or long
run, be better prevented by forms of justice alternative to criminal or
civil liability. By making space in the design of transnational
accountability mechanisms for deferring to domestic alternatives to
legal accountability, international law would integrate such

contextualized assessments of human rights protection.
This approach does not imply that peace and economic equality
are best addressed through a human rights framework. Neither does
the present proposal imply that peace and economic equality comprise
an exhaustive list. Rather, this Article offers them as examples of the
kind of consideration that can legitimately limit legal accountability.
In principle, any condition that is demonstrated to threaten core
human rights counts as justification for limiting accountability. For
instance, environmental degradation might justify limiting legal
accountability, as it is as harmful to core human rights as the other
consequences considered here. Indeed, a growing scholarly consensus
points to climate change as a cause of conflict. 168 Moreover,
environmental degradation often results in mass infringements of the
right to life.1 69 However, it is not clear whether legal accountability
could ever, in fact, conflict with environmental protection and such a
scenario is quite difficult to imagine.

166. The Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights has noted that
"[s]erious violations of international humanitarian and human rights law are common
in many armed conflicts." OFFICE OF THE UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMM'R FOR HUMAN
RIGHTS, INTERNATIONAL LEGAL PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN ARMED CONFLICT, at

1, U.N. Pub. No. HRIPUB/11/01, U.N. Sales No. E.11.XIV.3 (2011).
167. On the economic foundations of mass violence, see Zinaida Miller, Effects of
Invisibility: In Search of the 'Economic'in TransitionalJustice, 2 INT'L J. TRANSITIONAL

JUST. 266, 287-90 (2008); Susan Marks, Human Rights and Root Causes, 74 MOD. L.
REV. 57, 61-62 (2011) and the sources referenced therein.
168. See, e.g., Marshall Burke, Solomon M. Hsiang & Edward Miguel, Climateand
Conflict, 7 ANN. REV. ECON. 577, 578, 610 (2015) (surveying fifty-five studies in
economics and other disciplines on the relation between climate and conflict, and finding
that deviations from moderate temperatures and precipitation patterns systematically
and often substantially increase the risk of conflict [both interpersonal and intergroup]).
169. See Paula Spieler, The La Oroya Case: The Relationship Between
Environmental Degradationand Human Rights Violations, 18 HUM. RTS. BRIEF 19, 2223 (2010); Dinah Shelton, Human Rights, Environmental Rights, and the Right to
Environment, 28 STAN. J. INT'L L. 103, 116 (1991).
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Another potential justification for limiting accountability is
democracy. What if, following an authentically participatory process, a
legislature grants amnesties to perpetrators of atrocity for a reason not

connected to the preservation of peace or economic equality? Should
the democratic nature of the decision-making process not justify the
decision to forego legal accountability? The answer to this question is
not clear under the present framework. On the one hand, this
framework's value judgment that human rights are hierarchically
superior to other norms counsels against giving states full discretion
as to the remedies available for gross human rights violations. On the
other hand, it could be argued that democratic decision-making in and
of itself enhances the protection of core human rights as it promotes
harmonious social relations. This question requires further analysis,
which is beyond the scope of this Article.
The proposed approach does not involve simply foregoing
accountability in every case where the specter of a threat to peace or
economic inequality is raised. Having laid out the general contours of
human rights realism, the next Part elaborates on the modes of
operationalization of this approach with respect to various
accountability mechanisms and suggests a differential system based
on the strength of empirical evidence pointing to a threat to a core
human right.

V. HUMAN RIGHTS REALISM IN ACTION
Subpart A begins by providing illustrations of the human rights
realist approach in relation to various accountability mechanisms,
showing how this approach accounts for empirical uncertainties.
Subpart B then shows that human rights realism provides not only a
normative program but also sheds new light on recent debates.
A. OperationalizingHuman Rights Realism
This Article suggests a two-tiered approach based on the degree of
certainty concerning the risk of materialization of a threat to core
human rights. Institutionalizing limitations to accountability in a
systematic manner that applies to all cases, such as through a rule
granting all heads of state immunity from prosecution before the ICC,

requires a high degree of certainty that the absence of such immunity
would systematically threaten core human rights based on persuasive
empirical evidence. Such a limitation to accountability this Article calls
a "systematic limitation." In the absence of evidence of a systematic
threat, indications of a threat to core human rights in a particular case
being litigated could nevertheless justify limitations to accountability
in that case ("case-based limitation"). Case-based limitations would not
require waiting for the formation of an academic consensus following
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years of empirical studies; persuasive evidence convincing a court of
the likelihood of a threat to core human rights would suffice. As should
become clearer in what follows, case-based limitations to
accountability do not reflect an ad hoc, particularist form of justice of
the sort rejected in Part I. Rather, this framework ensures that
limitations to accountability

are carefully circumscribed to those

situations where the normative justifications for gaps between rights
and remedies have, in fact, materialized. Moreover, because they do
not rely on sustained empirical studies, case-based limitations allow
actors from the countries where the atrocities occurred to contribute
their local knowledge and to participate in the production of evidence
and design of accountability mechanisms.
1. Human Rights Realism in Universal Civil Jurisdiction
With respect to UCJ, it is difficult to imagine that the very
possibility of litigation against any type of defendant could constitute
a threat to a core human right. It is therefore unlikely that, under the
proposed approach, a systematic limitation on certain types of

defendant in exercises of UCJ, or on UCJ as a whole, could be
normatively justified. However, the rules regulating UCJ should be
adapted so as to enable case-based limitations. Such limitations can
concern the taking of jurisdiction or be more circumscribed, targeting
the enforcement of damage awards where threats to core human rights
materialize in particular cases. As indicated in Part III, this would

mean that the objection of a foreign state to an exercise of UCJ on the
grounds that it undermines peace negotiations or measures furthering
economic equality would preclude the taking of jurisdiction in the
particular case, where the court is convinced both that the negotiations
or conflicting measure is genuine and substantially threatened by the
exercise of UCJ. Even where a court entertains a case under UCJ, it
could preserve immunity over foreign state property in matters of
enforcement where it is convinced there is a potential conflict with
peace negotiations or with local processes furthering economic
equality, as the U.S. Supreme Court did in the Marcos ATS case: while
US courts took jurisdiction over the case and awarded the plaintiffs
damages, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that the Philippines' sovereign
immunity prevented US courts from adjudicating entitlement to
certain assets held in the United States and to which the Philippine
Republic and its Commission charged with recovering Marcos's assets
to fund a redistributive land policy lay claim. 170 In doing so the
Supreme Court removed from the ATS plaintiffs' assets from which to

170.

Philippines v. Pimentel, 553 U.S. 851, 872-73 (2008).
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enforce their damage award. While recognizing the interests of the
ATS class, Justice Kennedy noted that:
Comity and dignity interests take concrete form in this case. The claims of the
Republic and the [Philippine Commission charged with recovering Marcos's
assets] arise from events of historical and political significance for the Republic
and its people. The Republic and the Commission have a unique interest in
resolving the ownership of or claims to the ... assets and in determining if, and
how, the assets should be used to compensate those persons who suffered
171
grievous injury under Marcos.

Under the approach defended here, sovereign immunity in
relation to the assets would be justified in this case not on grounds of
protecting the foreign state's sovereignty per se, as in Kennedy's

remarks, but to the more limited extent that such sovereignty is used
to promote peace or distributive justice (the latter being precisely the
objective of the Philippines' transitional justice policy in recovering
Marcos's assets for redistribution). The exact mechanism whereby
courts would make such a determination could vary by jurisdiction,
depending on the legal culture, .structure of the judiciary, and its
relationship with the political branches of government. For instance,
in some jurisdictions, courts could rely primarily on determinations by
the executive branch of the forum. Nevertheless, as argued in Part I, a
realist appreciation for contextualism would require taking heed of
voices from the societies in which the litigated human rights abuses
occurred, including but not limited to those societies' governments.
Such limitations could also apply to exercises of UCJ where the
defendant is a corporation. Corporate defendants cannot be
categorically excluded from this analysis as they too can participate in
alternative justice measures in the transition from conflict or
authoritarianism. However, in practice it should prove very difficult to
find convincing evidence that an imposition of corporate liability
endangers peace or economic redistribution, as the effect of their legal
liability on these values should be indirect. Thus, limitations should be
imposed on corporate liability under UCJ only rarely.
2. Human Rights Realism in Regional Court Jurisprudence
In the context of regional court jurisprudence on the state duty to
prosecute and compensate, a human rights realist approach would
require regional courts to rule that states should forego prosecution
and full compensation of victims when doing so would compromise core
human rights. Implementing such an approach would involve the
Inter-American Court extending the El Mozote ruling to situations

171.

Id. at 866.
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172
Such an extension of El Mozote would allow
beyond armed conflict.

case-based limitations and allow them to be determined contextually
by states themselves, under the supervision of the regional court to

which petitioners could appeal to allege that the state in question
limited legal accountability for reasons other than to protect core
human rights.

It is more difficult to apply the proposed approach to the ECHR's
jurisprudence on the right of access to court, which provides the
framework for analyzing the limitations set by states on their courts'
exercises of universal jurisdiction (through interpretations of rules
173
This is
relating to foreign sovereign immunity and jurisdiction).
because human rights realism addresses the limitations to an
accountability mechanism once it is in existence, under the assumption
that such mechanism is normatively justified. However, the questions
74
go to the
raised by the ECHR's rulings on immunity and jurisdiction1
very recognition of UCJ in international law. The ECHR has held that
Switzerland's interpretation of rules of jurisdiction did not constitute
a disproportionate restriction on the right of access to court of a victim
of torture committed abroad, since customary international law does
1 75 Similarly, it has held that the
not mandate states to exercise UCJ.
United Kingdom's interpretation of immunity did not constitute a
disproportionate restriction on the right of access to court since it
reflected established rules of international law. 176 Though human
rights realism takes legal accountability as its starting point, it does
not offer a comprehensive theory of accountability that can justify the
specific accountability mechanism offered by UCJ. The current ECHR
jurisprudence would therefore not be directly altered by human rights
realism. However, were the court to recognize an international
obligation on states to exercise UCJ, human rights realism would
mandate that immunity and restrictive interpretations of jurisdiction
be permissible in cases of torture and other gross human rights abuses
only where such immunity or restrictive jurisdiction protect peace
negotiations or economic redistribution. Such a change in approach
could be implemented within the ECHR's existing jurisprudence on
limitations to rights, which requires the limitations to pursue a
177
legitimate aim and be proportionate to the aim pursued.

172. Massacres of El Mozote and Nearby Places v. El Salvador, Merits,
Reparations, and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 252, ¶¶ 37-38 (Oct.
25, 2012) (Garcia-SayAn, J., concurring).
173. See supra Part III.A.2 and the sources cited therein.
174.
175.

See id.
See supra note 82 and accompanying text.

176.
177.

See supra notes 72-76 and accompanying text.
See supra note 82 and accompanying text.
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3. Human Rights Realism in International Criminal Law

In the context of international criminal law, human rights realism
justifies adopting existing proposals to consider good faith domestic
justice processes that fall short of criminal prosecution and full
compensation, such as truth commissions, sufficient to preclude ICC
jurisdiction as well as the exercise of universal criminal jurisdiction

only where such domestic processes further peace or economic equality.
With respect to the ICC, such a case-based limitation would require
interpreting Article 17 of the Rome Statute so that domestic
institutions granting immunity to potential defendants in order to
further peace or economic equality would be deemed an investigation
or prosecution, thus rendering the case inadmissible. In addition,
Article 53 of the Rome Statute, according to which the prosecutor may
decide to not pursue a case based on the determination that an
investigation or case would not serve the "interests of justice," would
be interpreted so that the furtherance of peace or economic equality
would be included in the category of "interests of justice."1 78
With respect to universal criminal jurisdiction, human rights
realism requires domestic universal jurisdiction statutes to specify

that courts shall not have jurisdiction over defendants who have
benefitted from amnesties in the country where the crimes were
committed where such amnesties further one of the two interests
discussed here.1 79 It is important to note that these proposals do not
depend on a scholarly consensus, based on extensive empirical studies,
as to the general impact of international criminal justice on peace or
economic equality. As case-based limitations, they only require
demonstrating to the relevant court or legal officer that the alternative
mechanism in the particular case is intended to further these values
and is, in effect, designed to do so. In other words, they allow
limitations to accountability only in those specific cases where the
threat to core human rights is demonstrable.
Can more systemic limitations to accountability in international
criminal law be justified at present under human rights realism? For
instance, should demands for recognition of head of state immunity
from prosecution under the ICC be accepted? As indicated above, such
a position should be justified only in the presence of compelling
evidence that overall, the absence of such immunity constitutes a
substantial impediment to peace. The empirical studies on the subject

178. Rome Statute, supra note 126, art. 53(2)(c).
179. Accordingly, Principle 7 of the Princeton Principles on Universal Jurisdiction,
which states that "[a]mnesties are generally inconsistent with the obligation of states to
provide accountability for serious crimes under international law" should be
reinterpreted so as to clarify that amnesties are acceptable where they further the
protection of core human rights. THE PRINCETON PRINCIPLES ON UNIVERSAL
JURISDICTION 31 (Stephen Macedo ed., 2001).
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180
but they are still too few to offer
suggest such an impact on average,
the solid ground on which to base such a limitation to accountability.

As the subject is further explored in coming years, head of state
immunity may become justified.
It should be clear from the above that human rights realism is
both broader and narrower than other proposals to limit accountability
for atrocity. 181 It is broader in that it applies to a wide range of

accountability mechanisms

and goes beyond peace to consider

economic equality and possibly other values as values to be protected.
Yet it is narrower in that, in human rights realism, those values count
as justifications for limiting accountability, not in and of themselves,
but as indirect vehicles for the protection of core human rights.
Moreover, the adoption of restorative justice measures and of other
domestic decisions to forego legal accountability are recognized under

this view, not because of the local nature of the decision-making
process, but because they purport to further the protection of core
human rights (their local character being a sign that a contextual and,
between
of the relationship
weighty assessment
therefore,
accountability, and core human rights protection has been made).
B. African Withdrawal from the ICC and Human Rights Realism
The previous subpart explained how human rights realism could
accountability
transnational
various
across
implemented
be
mechanisms. This subpart further demonstrates the value of human
rights realism as a theoretical framework by showing that it can make
more intelligible recent debates on international criminal justice.
Specifically, this subpart shows that it sheds light on African critiques
of the ICC by delineating a third stance between human rights
absolutism and sovereigntism.

Discussions of African states' recent threats to withdraw from the
ICC appear, at first sight, to reproduce the conflict between
sovereigntism and human rights absolutism. In 2016, the governments
of the Republic of Burundi, the Republic of South Africa, and the
Islamic Republic of the Gambia announced their intention to withdraw
from the Rome Statute. 182 Only Burundi has followed through on its
threat and formally withdrawn. 183 However, these announcements

180.

See supra notes 147-48 and accompanying text.

181.

See supra notes 14-17 and accompanying text.

182. The Gambia Joins African Queue to Leave ICC, BBC NEWS (Oct. 26, 2016),
[https://perma.cc/R84X-CEN8]
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-37771592
(archived Sept. 22, 2020).
183. The Constitutional Court of South Africa ruled that such a withdrawal would
require legislative action. Democratic All. v. Minister of International Relations and
Cooperation 2017 (1) SACR 623 (GP) para. 81. As to Gambia, the newly elected
government reversed its policy on the ICC. Pap Saine & Lamin Jahateh, Gambia
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reflect a broader, ongoing crisis between the ICC and African states. In
2017, the African Union produced a "Withdrawal Strategy Document"
for its members. 184 In it, the Union denounced the disproportionate
focus in the court's caseload on African cases and set out a list of
proposed reforms to the Rome Statute, reforms that can be read as
implied conditions for African states to remain treaty members.1 85
Among these reforms are the grant of immunity from prosecution to

heads of state while in office and an expansion of the possibilities for
deferral of prosecution by enabling the UN General Assembly to decide
on a request to defer prosecution where the Security Council is unable
to do so under Article 16 of the Rome Statute. While complaints of
disproportionate attention to African states are taken seriously by
many commentators, a number of proponents of international criminal
justice have denounced the withdrawal threats as attempts by corrupt
African rulers to shield themselves from legal scrutiny, seeing in
discussions of withdrawal from the ICC a manifestation of the rise of
authoritarian populism-an extreme form of sovereigntism: Cherif
Bassiouni presented the withdrawal as furthering "[the] political
purposes" of "corrupt leaders,"1 86 while Luis Moreno Ocampo insisted
that "[t]he African bias is a cover up argument like the denial of the
Holocaust. It should not be considered as an argument but rather as
an alibi to ignore crimes and it should be exposed as such." 187
Withdrawal from the ICC is undoubtedly a way to escape legal
responsibility for some leaders. Impunity seems to be the main
motivation of Burundi's withdrawal, which was announced a few

weeks after the ICC's Office of the Prosecutor announced that it
intended to open an investigation for crimes against humanity
allegedly committed in Burundi and targeting civilians who opposed or
were perceived to oppose the ruling party.1 88 However, the realist
framework developed here offers an alternative way of understanding
African states' demands for granting heads of state immunity and

Announces Plans to Stay in International Criminal Court, REUTERS (Feb. 13, 2017),
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-gambia-justice-icc/gambia-announces-plans-to-stay]
[https://perma.cc/2L3L-SRUS
in-international-criminal-court-idUSKBN15S2HF
(archived Oct. 14, 2020).
184. See generally African Union, Draft 2, Withdrawal Strategy Document (June
2017),
https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/supporting-resources/
12,
iccwithdrawal_strategyjan._2017.pdf [https://perma.cc/F6KP-LRUG] (archived Oct.
13, 2020).
185. Id. ¶¶ 2, 30-36.
186. M. Cherif Bassiouni, Concerning the Withdrawal Problem, contribution to
Invited
Experts
on
the
Withdrawal
Question,
ICC
FORUM,
https://iccforum.com/withdrawal (last visited Sept. 22, 2020) [https://perma.cc/T4SPQDE4] (archived Sept. 22, 2020).
187. Luis Moreno Ocampo, From Brexit to African ICC Exit: A Dangerous Trend,
JUST SEcURITY (Oct. 31, 2016), https://www.justsecurity.org/33972/brexit-african-iccexit-dangerous-trend [https://perma.cc/KZW9-VTH3] (archived Sept. 22, 2020).
188. Burundi, INT'L CRIM. COURT, https://www.icc-cpi.intlburundi (last visited
Sept. 22, 2020) [https://perma.cc/92YG-DZW4] (archived Sept. 22, 2020).
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expanding possibilities of deferring prosecution. Under this
framework, these demands for reduced accountability should not be

brushed off as "politics" beyond the pale of international law. 189 They
should instead be considered to better promote human rights
protection:
First, in the Withdrawal Strategy Document, the African Union

frames its proposal to grant the UN General Assembly the authority to
decide on a deferral as a solution to the systemic imbalances in
international decision-making processes. 190 If General Assembly
authority to defer prosecutions is limited to the situations in which the

Security Council could have done so-maintaining peace-such a
reform would be in line with the approach advocated here by
broadening the possibilities of deferring prosecutions to further peace
and granting African states more voice in the decision-making process

about deferrals.
Second, the document explicitly expresses concerns for
peacemaking, quoting the Republic of South Africa's statement that it
has found that its obligations with respect to the peaceful resolution of conflicts
at times are incompatible with the interpretation given by the International
Criminal Court. . . . [I]n complex and multi-faceted peace negotiations and
sensitive post-conflict situations, peace and justice must be viewed as
complementary and not mutually exclusive.

19 1

The South African crisis with the ICC resulted from the Republic's
failure to extradite to the Hague Omar al-Bashir, president of Sudan,
attending the African Union Summit in South Africa in 2015, despite

189. For a rare call to take seriously African demands, see Kamari Maxine Clarke,
African Withdrawals: ForegroundingRome Statute Amendments As Critical to
Addressing the Structural Inequalities in Which the ICC Operates, contribution to
Invited Experts on

the

Withdrawal Question,

ICC FORUM,

https://iceforum.com/

withdrawal (last visited Sept. 22, 2020) [https://perma.cc/T4SP-QDE4] (archived Sept.
22, 2020).
190. According to the African Union's Withdrawal Strategy Document:
[T]he decisions of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) are made
on the basis of the interests of its Permanent Members rather than the legal
and justice requirements. Needless to say, these interests are not always in
line with those of Africa, thereby leading to a perception of a double standard
against African States. In this regard, questions about which states are under

the ICC's jurisdiction and the processes of selectivity of case as well as the role
of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) and its referral and deferral
mechanism under Article 16 of the Rome Statute raise questions about
perceived fairness of the international justice system as whole.
African Union, supra note 184, ¶ 3.
191. Id. ¶ 24.
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its obligation to do so under the Rome Statute. 192 In the view of the
Republic, the duty to extradite a sitting head of state, even when he
attends a regional conference, "compromise[s] South Africa's efforts to
promote peace and security on the African Continent and to play an
essential part in international peacekeeping missions in Africa and in

related peace processes.1"193 To remedy the situation, the Withdrawal
Strategy Document thus proposes amending Article 27 of the Rome
Statute, which currently provides for the irrelevance of a defendant's
official capacity, so as to grant immunity from prosecution to sitting

heads of state. 194 The previous subpart argues that such a proposal
constitutes a systemic limitation on accountability and, thus, requires

more persuasive empirical evidence (i.e., more of a scholarly consensus
than currently available). However, the human rights realist stance on

this demand is a far cry from the outraged rejection of the African
Union's proposal to limit accountability voiced by human rights

advocates. It suggests that this proposal should be considered over
time in light of emerging empirical findings in order to facilitate peace

negotiations and nonviolent withdrawals of authoritarian power.

VI.

CONCLUSION

This Article has developed a novel theoretical approach to
limitations to legal accountability for gross human rights violations,
one that takes seriously human rights norms, all the while
acknowledging and accounting for the political consequences of legal
interventions. It has proceeded by showing that the two dominant
alternative approaches are untenable and reconstructing a third
approach that avoids the flaws of each. Yet the Article has not
presented human rights realism as a theory mechanically yielding
precise normative outcomes and, therefore, much remains to be said
about the changes required by the proposed approach to existing legal
doctrines. Drawing on legal realism's complex view of law as well as
contemporary prudence about the certainty attainable through social
science, human rights realism offers a principled framework for
considering limitations to legal accountability. This framework
mandates viewing international norms protecting core human rights

as superior to other norms, all the while acknowledging that enforcing
those norms may have undesirable political consequences, which local
actors with contextualized knowledge have a privileged position to

192. South Africa's Withdrawal from the Rome Statute of the International
Criminal Court, S. AFR. CONSULATE GEN. MILAN, IT., http://www.dirco.gov.za/
milanitaly/newsandevents/rome statute.pdf
(last
visited
Sept.
22,
2020)
[https://perma.cc/XH3L-R7CQ] (archived Sept. 22, 2020).
193. Id.
194. See African Union, supra note 184, ¶ 30.
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assess. It requires relying on empirical studies but viewing them with
a critical eye and periodically revisiting one's evaluation as well as
accepting limitations to accountability in particular cases, even in the
absence of systematic empirical evidence. Nonconsequentialist
normative theories of accountability are, no doubt, simpler to apply.
However, for the lawyer with legal realist inclinations, ignoring the
concrete consequences of legal interventions is irresponsible. And

while those consequences can be the subject of theoretical conjecture,
they are best discovered through empiricism, a methodology which
carries its own share of difficulties. The Article thus advocates a
nuanced framework that honestly engages with the political effects of
law and the challenges of relying on empiricism for normative
purposes.
What about the consequences for human rights advocacy of
adopting human rights realism? Viewing this Article's normative

proposal through realist lenses, raises the question: How is such a
proposal likely to operate in the current political context? At a time of
backlash against international institutions, 195 might this approach
weaken human rights advocacy by leaving human rights advocates
with a lower set of demands towards states and, therefore, less
leverage in negotiations with them?
In the contemporary context, in which human rights norms are
challenged by illiberal politics, a common stance among human rights
professionals is to double down and insist on the authority and
legitimacy of international accountability norms. This Article suggests
that a different response is possible, one that acknowledges some of the
political concerns of the "other side" and addresses them frankly. This
author believes that, with human rights realism, ultimately human
rights advocates' stance should be more persuasive, for, contrary to the
current absolutist approach, it will openly acknowledge that rightsenforcement has practical consequences and doctrines protective of
sovereignty have some value and, hence, be perceived as more genuine.
This approach also recognizes potential dilemmas within human rights
advocacy-between accountability on the one hand and peace or
redistribution on the other-and thus furthers integrity as well as
effectiveness in human rights promotion.

195. See generally Mikael Rask Madsen, Pola Cebulak & Micha Wiebusch,
Backlash Against InternationalCourts:Explaining the Forms and Patternsof Resistance
to InternationalCourts, 14 INT'L J. L. IN CONTEXT 197 (2018).
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